Rape and POCSO proceedings quashed on the basis of the parties’ marriage and voluntary compromise.

The petitioner invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR Crime No. 435/2022 registered at Police Station Kurwai, District Vidisha, for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, together with consequential proceedings in Special Case No. 01/2023.

The petitioner and respondent No. 2—the prosecutrix/complainant—filed compromise applications supported by affidavits. The Principal Registrar verified the parties, their signatures, the contents of the applications, and the voluntary nature of the settlement, finding no threat, inducement or coercion.

The petitioner asserted that the prosecutrix had since attained majority, married him, and was residing with him as his wife; a marriage certificate was placed on record.

The State opposed quashing, while the complainant supported the compromise.

1. Whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS—referred to in the reasoning as Section 482 of the CrPC—to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings for non-compoundable offences under the IPC and POCSO Act on the basis of a compromise between the petitioner and the prosecutrix.

2. Whether the subsequent attainment of majority, marriage between the petitioner and the prosecutrix, and voluntary settlement justified quashing the criminal proceedings despite the objection of the State and the absence of the prosecutrix’s father as a party.

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS concerning the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, while also referring to Section 482 of the CrPC in its reasoning.

It relied on Jagdish Channa v. State of Haryana, Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, Shiji v. Radhika, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Parbatbhai Ahir v. State of Gujarat, which recognise that, in appropriate cases, proceedings involving non-compoundable offences may be quashed on the basis of a genuine and voluntary compromise where continuation of the prosecution would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of process.

The Court further proceeded on the basis that the prosecutrix was major, had married the petitioner, and had voluntarily supported the settlement.

The Court treated the compromise as voluntary because it had been independently verified by the Principal Registrar and was supported by the parties’ affidavits.

It considered the prosecutrix’s asserted majority, her marriage to the petitioner, their continued cohabitation as husband and wife, and her support for quashing the proceedings.

Applying the Supreme Court’s principles on quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise, the Court concluded that continuation of the trial would be a futile exercise and would not serve any useful purpose.

It therefore permitted compounding of the offences and overruled the objection concerning the prosecutrix’s father not being impleaded, on the ground that the prosecutrix was major and married to the petitioner.

The petition was accordingly allowed and disposed of.