Rash and negligent driving without knowledge of likely death attracts Section 304A, not Section 304 Part II IPC.

On 7 February 2023, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Dhapubai, Ikleshbai and Palak were sitting by the roadside outside their residence at Suthliya, District Rajgarh, when a white Indica car, allegedly driven by the appellant at high speed and on the wrong side of the road, struck them.

Dhapubai died at the spot, while Ikleshbai succumbed to her injuries on 15 February 2023 during treatment at Gandhi Medical College, Bhopal.

The appellant allegedly fled but was subsequently apprehended some distance from the scene by three or four youths, who were not examined at trial.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 304 Part II and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 146 read with 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, sentencing him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part II, along with additional sentences and fines.

The appellant challenged the conviction in an appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Whether the appellant’s act of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently, resulting in the deaths of two persons, constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, or merely causing death by negligence under Section 304A IPC?

Whether the convictions under Section 338 IPC and Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the sentence imposed, warranted interference?

The Court applied Section 304 Part II IPC, which requires proof that the accused caused death without an intention to cause death but with knowledge that the act was likely to cause death; and Section 304A IPC, which applies where death is caused by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide.

The Court also considered Section 338 IPC concerning grievous hurt caused by a rash or negligent act, and Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act concerning driving an uninsured vehicle and the related penalty.

The governing distinction was that rash or grossly negligent conduct, by itself, does not satisfy the additional requirement of knowledge of the likelihood of death necessary for Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court found that the evidence established that the accident resulted from the appellant’s rash and negligent driving at high speed on the wrong side of the road.

However, the prosecution did not produce cogent material proving that the appellant possessed the specific knowledge that his driving was likely to cause death, as required under Section 304 Part II IPC.

The fact that the appellant was apprehended away from the spot and that the persons who allegedly caught him were not examined further weakened the prosecution case on the aggravated mental element.

Accordingly, the conduct fell within Section 304A IPC rather than Section 304 Part II IPC.

The convictions under Section 338 IPC and Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act were not disturbed.

Considering the appellant’s young age, student status, absence of criminal antecedents and incarceration of one year and seventy-four days, the Court held that the sentence under Section 304A should be limited to the period already undergone.

The conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC was set aside and altered to one under Section 304A IPC.

The substantive sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, while the fines and default stipulations imposed by the trial court remained intact.

The convictions and concurrent sentences under Section 338 IPC and Sections 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act were upheld.

Subject to payment of the fines, the appellant was directed to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.