READINESS AND WILLINGNESS MUST BE CONTINUOUS FROM AGREEMENT DATE UNTIL DECREE TO WARRANT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

The Plaintiff (Appellant) entered into an agreement to sell with the Defendant (Respondent) on 20.12.1990 for a vacant site valued at Rs. 3,00,000/-.

The Plaintiff paid Rs. 25,000/- as earnest money, with the balance due within four months at the time of registration.

Disputes arose regarding the formation of an approach road and obtaining permissions under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCRA).

The Defendant rescinded the contract on 26.04.1991, citing the Plaintiff's failure to obtain ULCRA permission and expiry of time.

The Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance on 20.12.1993, nearly three years after the agreement.

The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed it, finding a lack of readiness and willingness.

The court primarily applied Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (pre-2018 amendment), which mandates that a plaintiff must specifically aver and prove continuous readiness (financial capacity) and willingness (conduct/intention) from the date of contract until the decree.

It relied on N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, establishing that readiness and willingness are conditions precedent.

His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, which distinguishes between financial capacity and conduct.

Regarding the impact of delay on equitable relief, the court applied principles from K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan and Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, holding that even if a suit is within limitation, unexplained delays and laches can bar discretionary relief.

The Court found that the Plaintiff failed the test of "readiness" because the Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) produced to prove financial capacity were dated between 1999 and 2001, proving funds only years after the suit was filed in 1993; no evidence existed for the relevant period.

Regarding "willingness," the Court noted the Plaintiff remained passive regarding ULCRA permissions, failing to provide necessary affidavits despite the obligation being mutual.

The Court analyzed the Plaintiff's conduct in light of the delay. Although the Defendant categorically refused to perform in April 1991, the Plaintiff waited until December 1993 to file the suit.

The Court reasoned that in suits for specific performance, time is often of the essence in practice, and a plaintiff must approach the Court with "quite promptitude" to invoke equity.

The Court held that the availability of funds must be proven at the time of the performance and filing, not subsequently, and that delayed filing at the "fag end" of the limitation period indicates a lack of continuous willingness.

The Appeal was dismissed, and the High Court’s judgment setting aside the decree of specific performance was upheld.