Referral court must limit enquiry to arbitration agreement's existence and petition's limitation, leaving claim-specific limitation to the arbitrator.

The Petitioners entered into an Agreement for Sale dated 05.11.2008 with Respondent No. 1 (Developer) for a flat in Kolkata for a consideration of Rs. 57,56,000/-

While possession was delivered upon full payment, the Respondents allegedly failed to execute the Deed of Conveyance within the stipulated 18 months

For several years, parties engaged in correspondence regarding discrepancies in the draft deed and maintenance issues

On 19.08.2025, the Respondents expressly waived their obligation to execute the deed, claiming the demand was barred by limitation

The Petitioners invoked the arbitration clause (Clause 11.1) via notice dated 10.09.2025

Upon the Respondents' refusal to appoint an arbitrator, the Petitioners approached the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 11(6) and Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which restricts judicial intervention to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement

The Supreme Court's decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024), which clarified and overruled the second limb of the test in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd. (2024)

Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to determine the limitation period for filing the Section 11 petition itself

Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) v. Bibijan & Ors. regarding the commencement of limitation for specific performance

The Court rejected Respondent No. 1’s contention that the claim was "dead" due to a 14-year delay.

The Court reasoned that following the latest precedent in Krish Spinning, the referral court's inquiry is strictly limited to two aspects: (a) the prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, and (b) whether the Section 11 petition was filed within three years of the refusal to appoint an arbitrator.

The Court noted that whether the underlying claim for the conveyance deed is time-barred is a mixed question of fact and law—involving continuous assurances and negotiations—which must be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal, not the referral court.

The Court found that the Section 11 petition was timely as it was filed shortly after the Respondents' formal refusal in 2025.

The Court found that a valid arbitration agreement exists and the Section 11 petition is within limitation.

The petition was allowed, and Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator.

The Arbitrator was granted the liberty to decide all objections, including limitation and maintainability, as preliminary issues.