Referral Court’s jurisdiction under Section 11 is confined strictly to prima facie examination of arbitration agreement’s existence.

The Petitioner and Respondent entered into Agreement No. 57/EE/SRDProject-1/PWD/2024-2025 on December 19, 2024.

Clause 25 of the Agreement provided a multi-tier dispute resolution mechanism involving conciliation and arbitration.

Following the emergence of disputes, the Petitioner invoked the arbitration clause via legal notice dated March 17, 2026, as required by Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The Petitioner subsequently approached the Delhi High Court under Section 11 of the Act seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.

The parties reached a consensus (ad idem) during proceedings that the dispute be referred to a Sole Arbitrator possessing specific technical qualifications stipulated in the contract.

1. Whether a Sole Arbitrator should be appointed under Section 11 of the Act given the existence of an arbitration agreement and the consent of the parties.

2. What is the permissible scope of judicial scrutiny by a Referral Court at the Section 11 stage.

Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the court’s power to appoint arbitrators.

Principles established by the Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024), which reconciled earlier 7-judge bench findings in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re.

Judicial intervention under Section 11 is confined solely to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.

The principle of "competence-competence" under Section 16, leaving questions of "accord and satisfaction" or frivolousness to the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court observed that the parties did not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement or the fulfillment of the Section 21 notice requirement.

Applying the "facilitative and procedural" role defined in Krish Spinning, the Court limited its enquiry to the existence of the agreement, refusing to embark upon any "laborious enquiry" into the merits of the claims.

The Court noted that since the parties explicitly agreed to refer the matter to an arbitrator who meets specific professional criteria (a Graduate Engineer of Chief Engineer rank), the court's duty was simply to give effect to this mutual intention.

The Court emphasized that all contentions regarding the merits remain open for the arbitrator to decide, ensuring minimum judicial interference as intended by the legislature.

The Court directed the Arbitrator to provide disclosures under Section 12(2) and fixed the fee structure in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the Act; the parties were directed to share the arbitral costs equally, and the petition was formally disposed of.