Referral Court’s jurisdiction under Section 11 is confined to prima facie examination of arbitration agreement existence.

The Petitioner filed five petitions under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The disputes arose from five similarly worded Development Agreements dated 30.06.2011, each containing an identical arbitration clause (Clause 20) designating Delhi as the venue.

The Petitioner invoked arbitration via legal notices dated 21.12.2022.

While the existence of the arbitration agreement was undisputed, the Respondent contended that the claims were barred by the law of limitation.

Previous court orders had directed parties to seek a consensus on an arbitrator or explore settlement, both of which failed.

1. Whether the court, under Section 11(6) of the Act, should resolve the issue of limitation or refer it to the Arbitral Tribunal.

2. Whether an arbitrator should be appointed to adjudicate the disputes via a composite reference given the failure of the parties to reach a consensus.

The Court applied Section 11(6) and 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which confines judicial scrutiny to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement.

It relied heavily on the three-judge bench decision in *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning*, which integrated the seven-judge bench ruling in *In re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act and Stamp Act*.

These precedents establish that the referral court must not conduct a "laborious enquiry" into contested facts like "accord and satisfaction" or limitation, as such matters fall within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under the principle of competence-competence (Section 16).

The Court observed that since the petitions were filed within three years of the notice invoking arbitration, the underlying issue of whether the substantive claims are time-barred is a matter for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide.

Following the mandate in *Krish Spinning*, the Court limited its interference to verifying the existence of the arbitration agreement.

It reasoned that the court’s role is purely facilitative—to resolve the deadlock in appointment—rather than adjudicative.

By appointing an arbitrator, the Court ensures arbitral autonomy and adheres to the legislative intent of minimal judicial interference.

The Court noted the parties were *ad idem* (in agreement) regarding the reference of disputes to arbitration, even though they could not agree on the specific personnel.

It held that the issue of limitation is within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Court appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai, Former Chief Justice of India, as the Sole Arbitrator.

The proceedings are to be conducted under the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) following its rules and fee schedule.

All rights and contentions regarding the merits and counter-claims were kept open for the Arbitrator’s determination.