Referral court under Section 11 must confine scrutiny to prima facie existence of arbitration agreement.

The Petitioner filed five petitions under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The disputes arose from five similarly worded Development Agreements dated 30.06.2011, each containing an identical arbitration clause (Clause 20) designating Delhi as the venue.

The Petitioner invoked arbitration via legal notices dated 21.12.2022.

While the existence of the arbitration agreement was undisputed, the Respondent contested the claims on the grounds of being barred by the law of limitation.

Previous court orders had directed the parties to seek a consensus on an arbitrator or an amicable settlement, both of which failed.

Whether the Court, under Section 11(6), should adjudicate on the issue of limitation or refer it to the Arbitral Tribunal?

What is the permissible scope of judicial scrutiny by a Referral Court at the stage of appointing an arbitrator?

The Court applied Section 11(6) and 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, noting that the 2015 Amendment limited judicial intervention to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.

It relied heavily on the three-judge bench decision in *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning* (2024), which incorporated the Seven-Judge Bench ruling in *Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re*.

These precedents establish that the Referral Court must only conduct a *prima facie* scrutiny of the agreement’s existence and leave all other "ruling" on jurisdiction, including issues of "accord and satisfaction" or limitation, to the Tribunal under Section 16.

The Court reasoned that since the petitions were filed within three years of the notice invoking arbitration, the issue of whether the underlying claims are time-barred is a matter of merits falling within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal.

Citing *Krish Spinning*, the Court emphasized that modern arbitration principles prioritize "arbitral autonomy" and "negative competence-competence," meaning courts should not perform a "laborious enquiry" into contested facts at the referral stage.

The judge noted that tests like the "eye of the needle" or "ex facie meritless" are no longer in strict conformity with the requirement for minimum judicial interference.

Consequently, as the existence of the arbitration agreement was admitted, the Court found its role to be purely facilitative to resolve the deadlock in appointment.

It appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. R. Gavai, Former Chief Justice of India, as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes via a composite reference.

The proceedings are to be conducted under the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) following its rules and fee schedule.

The Court clarified that all rights and contentions on merits remain open for the Arbitrator’s determination.