Refusal of Section 152 CPC amendment does not preclude furnishing property details for stamp duty assessment and decree completion.

A consent decree was passed by a Division Bench on May 22, 1997, based on a "Mittal Settlement" for the partition of properties.

While the settlement identified the properties, it lacked technical descriptions (title deed details/schedules), preventing the Collector from assessing the stamp duty necessary for drawing up and completing the decree.

In 1999, an application by Defendant No. 1 to alter the decree under Section 152 of the CPC was dismissed by the High Court and subsequently by the Supreme Court in 2009, on the grounds that the request did not fall within the scope of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors.

However, a later coordinate Bench order dated April 3, 2019, directed the Department to draw up the decree by collecting particulars from the pleadings and records.

In the present application, Defendant No. 1 sought to provide the necessary technical details via a supplementary affidavit to facilitate the Collector's assessment of stamp duty.

Whether the provision of technical property details for stamp duty assessment constitutes an impermissible modification of the decree, in light of the prior rejection of a Section 152 CPC application by the Supreme Court.

Whether the doctrine of merger and principles of finality preclude the Court from accepting technical details provided through a supplementary affidavit.

Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which governs the correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments or decrees.

Doctrine of Merger as discussed in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala, which stipulates that a lower court's order merges into the order of the superior court.

The principle from State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey, prohibiting the revival of rejected claims.

Rule 11 of Chapter 16 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, which allows the Department to include short recitals and particulars when drawing up a decree.

The Court distinguished between an application to alter a decree under Section 152 CPC and the ministerial act of drawing up and completing a decree.

It reasoned that the 1999/2009 rejections were based strictly on the technical limits of Section 152 and did not bar parties from enjoying the "fruits of the decree".

Furthermore, the 2019 coordinate Bench judgment—which was not challenged—expressly authorized the Department to collect particulars from the record to finalize the decree.

The Court found that the technical details in the supplementary affidavit were not "new" but existed within the broader pleadings and records of the case; thus, their disclosure was not an "improvement" of the case but a necessity for the Collector to fulfill the statutory requirement of assessing stamp duty.

Consequently, the doctrine of merger was inapplicable as the current prayer for completion of the decree was distinct from the previously rejected prayer for modification.

It directed the parties to file the requisite Form No. 1 before the Collector within a fortnight, incorporating the technical details provided in the supplementary affidavit.

The Collector was ordered to assess the stamp duty and submit a report to the High Court within four weeks.

All objections regarding the doctrine of merger and the nature of the supplementary affidavit were rejected.

Prayers for a stay of this order were refused.