Registering officer cannot adjudicate title; private registration for cause is within officer's subjective satisfaction.

The petitioner, a Sub-Registrar appointed under Section 6 of the Registration Act, 1908, registered two sale deeds in favor of the MP Electricity Board on February 21, 1994.

The registrations were conducted at the private residences of the sellers in exercise of powers under the proviso to Section 31 of the Act.

Subsequently, the State initiated departmental proceedings against the petitioner, alleging two charges of misconduct: (i) registering land held under government lease without the Collector's permission, thereby violating Section 165(7-b) and (10) of the CG Land Revenue Code, 1959; and (ii) visiting the sellers' residences for registration despite the sellers being physically capable of attending the office.

On October 31, 2000, the disciplinary authority imposed a penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect, a decision affirmed by the appellate authority on May 18, 2018.

The petitioner challenged these orders via a writ petition under Article 226.

1. Whether a registering officer is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the title of the property or the validity of a transfer under the CG Land Revenue Code when the revenue records do not indicate any restriction.

2. Whether the exercise of discretion to register documents at a private residence under the proviso to Section 31 of the Registration Act, 1908, constitutes misconduct.

The Court applied Sections 34(3) and 35(1) of the Registration Act, 1908, which limit the registering officer’s inquiry to the factum of execution and the identity of the parties.

It relied on K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar and Others (2025 SCC OnLine SC 740), which held that a registering officer lacks adjudicatory power to decide title.

The Court interpreted Section 165(7-b) and (10) of the CG Land Revenue Code, 1959, which prohibits the transfer of government-leased land without Collector’s permission.

The Court applied Section 31 of the Registration Act, 1908, which allows registration at a private residence upon "special cause being shown".

The Court found that the petitioner’s statutory obligations under Sections 34 and 35 of the Registration Act were limited to verifying the identity of the executants and the factum of execution, rather than investigating title.

Regarding the alleged violation of the CG Land Revenue Code, the Court observed that the revenue records provided to the petitioner recorded the sellers as Bhoomiswami and did not mention their status as government lessees.

Since the sale deeds explicitly declared no violation of Section 165, and the State failed to show that any material existed at the time of registration to suggest the land was a government lease, the petitioner could not be held liable for registering the deeds without the Collector's permission.

The Court held that the proviso to Section 31 is an enabling provision based on the "subjective satisfaction" of the officer; once a cause was assigned and accepted, the decision could not be termed misconduct.

The High Court quashed the disciplinary order dated October 31, 2000, and the appellate order dated May 18, 2018, and directed that the petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits.

The writ petition was allowed.