Registration may proceed despite name discrepancies, with alienation barred pending proof of identity and ownership.

The petitioner’s 1997 sale deed recorded her as “G. Punithavathi, W/o. R. Kannan,” while the settlement deed she later presented for registration identified her as “Punitha @ Punithavathi, W/o. Ganesan”.

The Joint Sub Registrar refused registration by a refusal check slip dated 17 July 2026, citing the identity discrepancy.

The petitioner sought certiorari and a direction to register the settlement deed, asserting that the differing names referred to the same persons.

1. Whether the settlement deed should be registered despite discrepancies in the petitioner’s and her husband’s names between the prior sale deed and the settlement deed.

2. Whether registration could be directed while leaving the petitioner’s identity as the purchaser under the 1997 sale deed, and her ownership of the property, to be established in accordance with law.

Rule 162 of Chapter XXIII of the Registration Rules, framed under the Registration Act, 1908, was invoked by the respondents for the proposition that registration may be refused if the registering officer is not satisfied as to the identity of a person appearing as an executant.

The Court also considered its earlier decision in W.P.(MD) No.16894 of 2026, which had directed registration on the basis of an affidavit and supporting identity documents, provided there was no other impediment.

The present judgment did not set out a general interpretation of Rule 162; it directed registration subject to a restriction on further alienation until identity and ownership were established.

The Court noted that the discrepancy concerned both the petitioner’s name and her husband’s name in the 1997 sale deed and the settlement deed.

Rather than finally determining that the differently named persons were one and the same, or that the petitioner had established title, it directed registration while preserving the question of identity and ownership for determination in accordance with law.

To address that uncertainty, it barred the petitioner’s daughter from further alienating the property until the petitioner’s identity as the purchaser under the 1997 sale deed and as the settlement deed’s executant, and her ownership, were established.

The daughter was not to further alienate the property until the petitioner established, in accordance with law, that she was the purchaser under Document No. 660 of 1997, the executant of the settlement deed, and the owner of the property.

No costs were ordered.