Rejection of Section 156(3) application does not bar later FIR on cognizable offence, rules Supreme Court

The complainant alleged that the appellant represented that, through his influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, he could secure Clerk appointments for the complainant’s son and grandson in exchange for ₹20,00,000.

Relying on this representation, the complainant transferred various sums to the appellant’s bank account in January 2023.

When the promised appointments did not materialise, the appellant allegedly abused and threatened the complainant and his family members in May 2024, and allegedly supplied forged admit cards and examination results.

The police registered FIR No. 405/2024 under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 IPC.

Earlier, the complainant had filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC on substantially similar allegations.

The Magistrate rejected that application after considering a police report which treated the dispute as arising from land transactions; the revision was also dismissed.

The appellant’s petition seeking quashing of the FIR was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court, which held that rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) application did not bar subsequent FIR registration where cognizable offences were disclosed.

1. Whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC, founded on the same or substantially similar allegations, operates as a bar to the subsequent registration of an FIR and continuation of criminal proceedings?

2. Whether the allegations in FIR No. 405/2024, taken at face value, disclosed cognizable offences warranting investigation or required quashing under the principles governing Section 482 CrPC jurisdiction?

Sections 154 and 156 CrPC impose an independent statutory duty on the police to register and investigate information disclosing a cognizable offence; Section 156(3) empowers the Magistrate to direct investigation where the police fail or refuse to act.

An order under Section 156(3) merely regulates or initiates investigation and does not constitute an adjudication on the merits of the allegations or determine the rights and liabilities of the proposed accused.

Accordingly, rejection of such an application does not attract res judicata so as to bar a subsequent FIR.

The Court relied on Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. , Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy , Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat , S.C. Garg v. State of U.P. , and Mahendri v. State of U.P.

Under Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. , FIR registration is mandatory where the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence.

At the quashing stage, applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , the court examines only whether the allegations, accepted in their entirety, disclose an offence and does not assess their truth, reliability or evidentiary value.

The Court held that the Magistrate’s rejection of the Section 156(3) application was not a final adjudication on the truth or merits of the complainant’s allegations.

It therefore did not preclude the police from registering an FIR upon subsequently furnished information disclosing cognizable offences.

The decision in Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu was distinguished because it concerned the maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3), whereas the present case involved the police’s independent statutory power and duty under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC.

On the allegations in the FIR, the appellant had allegedly induced the complainant to pay money by promising public employment, received the money, furnished forged documents, and threatened the complainant upon demand for repayment.

These allegations prima facie disclosed offences under the IPC.

The appellant’s contention that the payments related to property transactions, together with challenges to the police report and evidentiary material, involved disputed questions of fact that could not be determined in proceedings for quashing the FIR.

Rejection of the earlier application under Section 156(3) CrPC did not bar the subsequent registration or investigation of FIR No. 405/2024, since that rejection neither adjudicated the merits nor extinguished the police’s statutory duty to act on information disclosing a cognizable offence.

As the FIR prima facie disclosed cognizable offences and the appellant’s defence required investigation and appreciation of evidence, the Court found no ground for quashing the proceedings.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the High Court’s order was affirmed.