Reliable identification and medical corroboration sustain conviction for aggravated penetrative gang rape under POCSO Act.

On March 9, 2015, the victim (aged 13-14) and her cousin were intercepted by miscreants while returning from a ration shop in Sunaicherra

The victim was forcibly taken into a jungle and gang-raped at knife-point

She was recovered in an unconscious state by her father (PW-5)

The Trial Court convicted the appellants, Basir Uddin and Romjul Hussain, under Section 376D IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing them to imprisonment for the remainder of their natural lives

The appellants challenged the conviction primarily on the grounds of defective identification, delay in conducting the Test Identification Parade (TIP), and alleged false implication

The court applied Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code (Gang Rape) and Section 6 of the POCSO Act (Aggravated penetrative sexual assault)

It relied on Section 9 of the Evidence Act regarding the relevancy of identification

The court followed principles from Mulla v. State of U.P., holding that TIP is corroborative and dock identification is substantive evidence

It further applied State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, establishing that an FIR is not an encyclopedia and omissions of minute details do not justify rejecting reliable evidence

Finally, it applied the "foundational facts" doctrine under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act as interpreted in Bhupen Kalita v. State of Assam

The court confirmed the victim's minority (13-14 years) based on the Medical Officer's (PW-10) radiological opinion and the victim’s Section 164 statement

Regarding identification, the court noted that Basir Uddin was previously known to the victim as a laborer and was named in the FIR

Although Romjul Hussain was not named initially, he was identified by the victim in three distinct rounds of a TIP conducted by a Magistrate (PW-9) within 25 days, which was later corroborated by dock identification

The medical evidence (Exbt-10) provided strong corroboration, showing signs of recent sexual intercourse, physical violence (lacerations), and the presence of spermatozoa on the vaginal swab

The court dismissed the contention regarding the "fourth person," clarifying that the victim's testimony explained the fourth person was a bystander who did not participate in the assault; thus, his omission from the FIR was not a material contradiction

The court held that the testimony of the prosecutrix was cogent, reliable, and sufficiently corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence

Both appeals were dismissed