Religious practice on public or private land is subject to public order and cannot claim absolute immunity.

The petitioner filed a writ of mandamus seeking security and permission to offer Namaz (prayers) on a plot of 82.80 sq. meters in Village Ikona, Sambhal, claiming it to be his private property under a registered gift deed dated June 16, 2023.

He alleged that respondent authorities, in collusion with social elements, were interfering with his fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

The State countered that the land is recorded as Abadi land for public use (Shreni-6(2)) and that the gift deed lacked identifiable revenue particulars like Gata or Khata numbers.

The State further submitted that Namaz at this location was traditionally restricted to Eid, and the petitioner was attempting to introduce new, large-scale congregational activities involving outsiders, potentially disturbing communal harmony.

1. Whether, and to what extent, the rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 extend to the conduct of congregational religious activities, whether on public land or private premises.

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, noting that the right to practice religion is subject to public order, morality, and health.

The court relied on Commissioner, HRE, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (1954), which established that religious rights are not dissociated from constitutional limitations.

M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994), which held that no particular place can be claimed as a matter of right for offering Namaz.

Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) regarding the state’s duty to maintain social harmony.

State Government Orders (dated 2024–2026) mandating that no new religious traditions or non-traditional activities be permitted in public spaces.

The court reasoned that while private, occasional prayer within one’s home is protected, such activity loses its purely private character once it becomes congregational, regular, or involves the public.

At that stage, it creates external consequences—such as noise, traffic, and potential communal tension—rendering it subject to state regulation.

Regarding public land, the court held that no individual has an exclusive right to use it for recurring religious gatherings, as it must remain accessible to all.

In the present case, the court found the petitioner’s claim of ownership unsubstantiated because the gift deed lacked revenue particulars and contradicted the official revenue record identifying the land as public Abadi.

Even if the land were private, the court noted that the petitioner was attempting to expand a traditional practice (Eid prayers) into a new, regular congregation, which the State is entitled to prevent to preserve public order.

The court concluded that: (i) public land cannot be used for exclusive religious purposes; (ii) religious practice is subject to the rights of others and public order; (iii) private property usage for religion is protected only while it remains genuinely private and non-disruptive; and (iv) the introduction of new religious practices that disturb social balance is not constitutionally protected. No costs were ordered.