Religious propagation accompanied by alleged coercion or fraud prima facie attracts Gujarat’s anti-conversion law.

The applicant, a Female Health Worker at Bamanva Primary Health Centre, was the sole accused in FIR No. 11215013250640 dated 19 November 2025 and the consequential Criminal Case No. 167 of 2026.

The FIR alleged that, after official meetings, she required the complainant and four ASHA workers to remain behind, propagated Christianity, criticised Hindu idol worship, distributed Christian literature, and showed religious videos.

It was further alleged that she threatened adverse employment consequences, including salary deductions, if they refused to participate.

The complainant and the other workers were allegedly invited to a Vadodara programme under the pretext of attending a Primary Health Centre meeting, but on arrival found it to be a Christian religious event where sermons, skits and conversion experiences were presented.

During investigation, statements of the other ASHA workers allegedly supported the complainant’s version; WhatsApp messages were recovered, religious books and pamphlets were seized, and the applicant’s electronic devices were sent for forensic examination.

The District Magistrate, Anand, granted sanction under Section 6 of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003 on 6 March 2026, following which the charge-sheet was filed for offences under Sections 4(1), 4(2) and 4C of the Act.

The applicant sought quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and criminal proceedings under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The Court applied Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Sections 3, 4(1), 4(2) and 4C of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003 prohibit conversion or attempted conversion by force, allurement, fraudulent means, coercion or related prohibited methods, and impose liability on persons who aid, abet or are responsible for offending institutions.

Section 6 requires prior sanction for prosecution, while Section 3A was considered in relation to the initiation of complaints.

Article 25 protects the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, but only subject to public order, morality and health; it does not protect conversions secured through force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Relying on Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, the Court recognised the religious rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses, but held that such rights remain constitutionally limited.

It also relied on Durga Yadav v. State of U.P., which adopted a broad, purposive interpretation of the statutory right to report unlawful conversion and held that police authorities may initiate proceedings in cognizable cases.

Under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, quashing is justified only in the recognised exceptional categories where the allegations do not disclose an offence or continuation of proceedings would constitute abuse of process.

The Court held that, at the quashing stage, it was required only to determine whether the allegations and investigation material prima facie disclosed cognizable offences, not to assess the ultimate probability of conviction.

The allegations that the applicant isolated the workers after official meetings, showed religious videos behind closed doors, distributed Bibles, criticised Hindu religious practices, allegedly used her supervisory position to threaten salary-related consequences, and procured their attendance at a Christian programme by misrepresenting its nature were capable of constituting fraudulent means, coercion or undue influence within the statutory framework.

The fact that the workers attended the programme and accepted food did not negate the allegation that they had been induced to attend by misrepresentation.

Although the applicant contended that she lacked authority over salaries, the Court found that her role in supervising the complainant and the ASHA workers placed her in a position of authority capable of supporting the allegation of employment-related pressure.

Article 25 did not justify conduct allegedly involving deception or coercive influence.

The locus objection was rejected in light of the purposive interpretation recognised in Durga Yadav, and the sanction objection failed because the District Magistrate had granted sanction on 6 March 2026 before filing of the charge-sheet.

Consequently, the matter did not fall within any Bhajan Lal category warranting quashing.

It held that the allegations and material collected during investigation prima facie disclosed cognizable offences under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003, that the applicant’s Article 25 defence could not be conclusively determined at the quashing stage, that the complainant’s locus objection was untenable, and that the statutory sanction requirement had been satisfied.

The applicant was left at liberty to raise all permissible contentions before the trial court, which was directed to consider them independently and without being influenced by the High Court’s prima facie observations.