Remand in a completed Section 138 trial is unwarranted absent demonstrated prejudice to the accused.

The appellant was the complainant in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), and the respondent was the accused.

The Trial Court had proceeded with the trial, during which the accused was examined as DW-1. His defence was that he had issued a signed blank cheque as security for a loan of ₹10 lakhs, whereas the cheque was presented for ₹30 lakhs; he also contended that the complainant was not present at Bengaluru on the dates relevant to the alleged transaction.

The Trial Court observed that the accused could have produced call data records to establish the complainant’s absence.

Neither before the Trial Court nor before the First Appellate Court did the accused allege prejudice.

In revision, however, the High Court remanded the matter for a fresh trial from the stage of defence evidence, relying on M/s Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83.

Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act for a fresh trial from the stage of defence evidence, despite the absence of any plea or demonstrated prejudice to the accused.

Whether the decision in M/s Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore required such a remand in the circumstances of the case.

Section 145(1) of the NI Act permits the complainant’s examination-in-chief to be given by affidavit, which may be read in evidence subject to just exceptions. Under Section 145(2), the Court may summon the person giving evidence on affidavit for examination regarding the facts stated therein; where either the prosecution or the accused applies for such examination, the person must be called and examined.

M/s Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83, further distinguishes the complainant’s evidence from the accused’s defence evidence and holds that the accused cannot be permitted to give evidence on affidavit, since the defence may involve evidence beyond documentary material.

These principles must, however, be applied in a criminal case with reference to actual prejudice caused to the accused in the completed trial.

Once the cheque signature is admitted, the statutory presumption under the NI Act operates unless rebutted.

The Supreme Court held that Mandvi Cooperative Bank did not automatically require a remand.

Although the accused had advanced a defence concerning a security cheque, the alleged excess amount, and the complainant’s absence, he neither produced substantive evidence of the complainant’s unavailability nor demonstrated that the trial procedure caused him prejudice.

He could have obtained the complainant’s call data records, but did not do so.

The accused also failed to raise prejudice before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, and the admitted signature attracted the statutory presumption, which remained unrebutted.

The High Court therefore erred in accepting the procedural objection raised for the first time in revision and in ordering a fresh trial solely on that basis.

The criminal revision was restored to the High Court for consideration on its remaining merits.

The Supreme Court directed that only the evidence initially led at trial should be considered; if the Trial Court had subsequently examined the accused in person after the remand, that subsequent evidence was to be excluded.

Pending applications, if any, were rejected.