Removal for fare misappropriation is not disproportionate merely because the amount involved is petty.

The petitioner, appointed as a conductor by the Delhi Transport Corporation in 1979, was charge-sheeted for allegedly collecting ₹2 from a passenger but issuing a ₹1 ticket, and for a cash shortage of ₹10 during an inspection on 15 July 1991.

Following a domestic enquiry, he was removed from service on 10 February 1992.

The Industrial Tribunal approved the punishment under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that approval was upheld by the Delhi High Court in an earlier proceeding.

In the subsequent reference under Section 10, the petitioner challenged the fairness of the enquiry, contended that the punishment violated the DTC circular dated 3 January 1966, and argued that removal was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

The Industrial Tribunal rejected his claim, holding the enquiry proper and declining to interfere with the punishment.

The petitioner then invoked the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, principally challenging the enquiry findings and the quantum of punishment.

Whether the Industrial Tribunal, while adjudicating the subsequent industrial dispute, could rely upon the earlier proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the domestic enquiry was otherwise fair and proper.

Whether the punishment of removal from service was shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct involving the alleged short issuance of a ticket and a cash shortage of ₹10.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a lesser punishment under the DTC circular dated 3 January 1966 on the ground that the misconduct constituted only his second charge of cheating.

Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 concerns approval of an employer’s action during the pendency of industrial proceedings, whereas a subsequent reference under Section 10, read with Section 11A, requires an independent adjudication and may permit modification of the punishment; approval under Section 33(2)(b) does not, by itself, foreclose that jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, a court or tribunal may rely upon material and findings recorded in earlier competent proceedings, provided it independently considers the relevant record.

Judicial review under Article 226 is supervisory, not appellate, and interference is unwarranted merely because another view of the evidence is possible.

The Court relied on Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. B. Swamy, (2007) 12 SCC 40, and U.P. SRTC v. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 555, for the principle that dishonesty or misappropriation by a conductor may warrant dismissal or removal even where the amount involved is small or the misconduct is alleged to be a first occurrence.

The DTC circular prescribed a general policy but expressly preserved discretion to impose severe punishment even for a first or second case, depending on the merits.

The Court held that although the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and the subsequent reference were legally distinct, the Tribunal had not relied solely on the earlier approval order.

It independently examined the record and found that the petitioner had participated in the enquiry, had admitted the charges in his reply, and had stated that he did not require any further enquiry.

The charge-sheet had supplied the relevant documents, and the petitioner had not requested additional documents; his later objection regarding non-supply of witness and document lists was therefore treated as an afterthought.

His plea that illness caused the mistaken issuance of a lower-value ticket was unsupported by medical evidence or any contemporaneous material.

As to punishment, the Court found that the alleged misconduct concerned dishonesty in the discharge of a conductor’s duties and that the DTC circular did not mandate a lesser penalty for a second offence.

In light of the governing precedents, the small monetary value did not render removal disproportionate.

Given the limited scope of writ review and the considerable lapse of time since the disciplinary action in 1991, no ground for interference was established.

The petition was dismissed, and all pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.