Rent Act revision cannot disturb concurrent factual findings absent perversity or gross error.

The landlords sought eviction of the tenant from a residential house let at ₹25 per month, alleging that he had made permanent alterations and caused nuisance and annoyance to other tenants.

The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that neither a permanent structure nor nuisance had been proved; it nevertheless observed that the tenant should keep his goods so as not to obstruct the by-lane.

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, and the landlords brought this revision under Section 29(2) of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“Rent Act”).

1. Whether the tenant’s alterations to the premises amounted to erection of a permanent structure under Section 13(1)(b) of the Rent Act.

2. Whether the concurrent findings that the landlords had not proved permanent construction or nuisance were liable to be disturbed in revision under Section 29(2) of the Rent Act.

Section 13(1)(b) of the Rent Act, read with its explanation, concerns eviction on the ground of the tenant’s erection of a permanent structure.

Section 29(2) limits the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction: it may examine whether the lower court’s decision is according to law, but cannot reappreciate evidence merely to reach a different factual conclusion; interference is available where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, reached without considering material evidence, or otherwise grossly erroneous so as to cause a miscarriage of justice.

The Court applied the Constitution Bench decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, for these limits on rent-control revision.

The Court accepted that the tenant had converted the kitchen into a room for his son and covered the porch for use as a kitchen, but noted that the landlords had not produced material showing that these changes constituted a permanent structure; the lower courts found that they could be removed without material damage to the premises.

The evidence also indicated that the old property required repairs and that the tenant had undertaken repairs with the landlords’ permission and at his own expense.

As to nuisance, the landlords had not established their allegation through evidence from co-tenants, and the trial court’s observation about keeping goods clear of the by-lane did not amount to a finding that nuisance had been proved.

The concurrent findings were supported by the evidence and were neither perverse nor grossly erroneous, so the Section 29(2) threshold for interference was not met.

It dismissed the revision application, discharged the Rule, made no order as to costs, and directed that the record and proceedings be returned to the concerned court.