Repeal of the 1994 GIA Order does not bar claims sufficiently crystallised before repeal.

The appellants were lecturers and retired lecturers of Indravati Higher Secondary School, Jaipatna, a private institution established in 1984 and recognised by the Government and CHSE.

The institution submitted applications for Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, first in 1995 and again in 2002. It was subsequently considered by governmental authorities, including the High Power Committee and the Director of Higher Education, whose recommendation dated 28.10.2015 followed physical verification of the institution’s original records.

Although the institution was initially notified under the GIA Order, 2004, it was re-notified under the GIA Order, 1994 by notification dated 27.04.2021. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, by order dated 01.11.2021, withdrew or denied the benefit on the ground that the 1994 Order had been repealed.

The appellants approached the State Education Tribunal under Section 24-B of the Orissa Education Act, 1969. The Tribunal dismissed both applications at the admission stage on 22.01.2024, relying principally on State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati, holding that the repealed GIA Order, 1994 could no longer support the claims; in one case, it also questioned the individual appellant’s locus standi. The appellants filed the present appeals under Section 24-C of the Act.

Whether repeal of the GIA Order, 1994 absolutely extinguished the appellants’ claim for Grant-in-Aid, notwithstanding applications, governmental consideration, and recommendations made in relation to the institution before or after repeal.

Whether the Tribunal erred in summarily dismissing the GIA applications on the basis that the institution had not received Grant-in-Aid before repeal, without undertaking an examination of whether the claim had sufficiently crystallised before 05.02.2004.

Whether the Tribunal’s additional finding that the appellant in FAO No.219 of 2024 lacked locus standi was sustainable.

Section 7-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969 empowers the State Government to provide Grant-in-Aid to private educational institutions, subject to prescribed conditions.

The GIA Order, 1994, issued under that power, was repealed with effect from 05.02.2004 by the GIA Order, 2004; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 preserves rights that had accrued or vested before repeal, but not a mere hope, expectation, or pending opportunity to apply.

Under State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati, mere eligibility, completion of the qualifying period, or submission of an application does not automatically create a vested right to Grant-in-Aid, which remains subject to assessment, selection, and the State’s economic capacity.

However, State of Odisha v. Ratnakar Mohapatra, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3904 of 2026 on 25.03.2026, recognises that Anup Kumar Senapati is not an absolute bar where the claim had materially progressed and the competent Directorate had made a recommendation before repeal; such cases require factual verification.

The Supreme Court subsequently disposed of the appellants’ own SLP on the same terms as the Ratnakar Mohapatra proceedings.

The High Court held that the Tribunal applied an impermissibly strict “receipt-before-repeal” test, relying on authorities that required Grant-in-Aid to have actually been received before repeal.

The applicable inquiry, particularly after Ratnakar Mohapatra, was whether the appellants’ claim had sufficiently crystallised through applications, competent recommendations, and administrative consideration before repeal, rather than whether payment had already commenced.

The institution had submitted applications in 1995 and 2002, and its claim had thereafter been the subject of governmental and Directorate-level consideration, including the recommendation dated 28.10.2015 based on physical verification.

Nevertheless, the Court declined to determine conclusively whether these steps created an accrued or vested right, because that question required examination of the complete record, the authority and legal status of each recommendation, and the institution’s position as on 05.02.2004.

The Tribunal’s threshold rejection therefore prevented the legally necessary factual inquiry.

The Court also rejected the appellants’ natural-justice objection, noting that the Tribunal’s order recorded that the matter had been heard and that any denial of hearing was not a grievance available to the appellants on behalf of the State.

The matters were remitted to the competent authority, principally the Director of Higher Education, to comprehensively examine the institution’s applications, recommendations, governmental decisions, the 27.04.2021 notification, and the 01.11.2021 disentitlement order in light of Anup Kumar Senapati, Ratnakar Mohapatra, and the Supreme Court’s order dated 25.03.2026.

The authority must afford the appellants an opportunity to produce supporting materials, pass a reasoned and speaking order within three months of production of the certified judgment, and must not reject the claims solely because the Tribunal proceedings were instituted after repeal of the GIA Order, 1994.

The High Court expressly left the appellants’ substantive entitlement open and made no final finding that their claims had crystallised before repeal.

No order as to costs was made.