Repeated consensual relations despite knowledge of the accused’s marriage prima facie negate a false promise to marry.

The applicant sought regular bail in FIR No. 159/2026 registered at Police Station Vasant Kunj North for offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC.

The prosecutrix, aged approximately 29 years, met the applicant at their workplace in December 2023. She alleged that, after the applicant assured her that he would marry her, they entered into sexual relations on several occasions, including repeated stays at a hotel in Mahipalpur.

She further alleged that she conceived twice and underwent abortions, and subsequently discovered that the applicant was married and had two children.

The applicant contended that the relationship was consensual and that he had been falsely implicated because he had demanded repayment of a loan allegedly taken by the prosecutrix.

The prosecution alleged that the applicant used a false identity card at the hotel and that the prosecutrix impersonated another woman.

The applicant had been in custody since 15 May 2026 and the chargesheet had been filed.

Whether, at the stage of considering regular bail, the alleged sexual relations appeared to have been induced by a false assurance of marriage, thereby attracting criminality, or were prima facie consensual relations between two adults.

Whether the applicant was entitled to release on regular bail notwithstanding the prosecutrix’s apprehension of threats or interference with prosecution witnesses.

The Court considered the allegations under Sections 376 and 506 IPC, while applying the general principles governing regular bail, including a prima facie assessment of the prosecution case, the circumstances of custody, filing of the chargesheet, and the risk of influencing witnesses.

The Court held that consensual sexual relations between adults do not constitute an offence merely because one party subsequently alleges a promise to marry; criminal liability may arise where consent was tainted from the outset by a false assurance or misrepresentation intended to induce sexual relations.

The Court also distinguished moral or matrimonial wrongdoing—such as a married person engaging in an extramarital relationship—from criminal conduct in the absence of the statutory ingredients of an offence.

The Court found several circumstances inconsistent, prima facie, with the allegation that the relationship was wholly induced by a false promise of marriage. The prosecutrix was an adult, educated or working, and had continued the relationship over a substantial period, including multiple hotel stays and two abortions.

Even after allegedly discovering in October 2024 that the applicant was married and had two children, she continued the relationship until May 2026.

The Court considered it difficult to accept that she would continue relying on an alleged representation regarding pending divorce proceedings without requiring documentary proof.

The Court also considered the alleged use of a false identity at the hotel significant, observing that the applicant’s conduct in using a false identity and asking the prosecutrix to misrepresent herself could have raised suspicion if marriage had genuinely been intended.

The screenshots of conversations between the prosecutrix and the applicant’s wife, including threats allegedly made by the prosecutrix in March 2026, were also considered relevant to the applicant’s plea of false implication and the timing of the FIR in May 2026.

On this material, the Court formed a prima facie view that the relations were consensual and not tainted by a false promise of marriage or cheating, while expressly clarifying that the trial court would independently assess the evidence at trial.

The applicant was specifically restrained from contacting any prosecution witness, with a warning that violation could invite appropriate legal action.

The Court also recorded the Investigating Officer’s proposal to conduct further investigation regarding the alleged impersonation and to initiate appropriate proceedings if warranted.

The observations on consent and the alleged false promise were expressly limited to the determination of bail and were not to influence the trial court’s final decision.