Repeated representations do not create a fresh cause of action for a time-barred claim.

The applicant, Subash Chandra Prusty, joined NSIC as an Accounts Officer on July 31, 1995.

He qualified in the ICWA examination in December 1995, during his probation period.

He made representations for promotion to Deputy Manager (Accounts) based on a circular dated May 9, 1988.

The department later issued instructions on August 20, 1996, changing the policy from promotion to two increments for acquiring higher qualifications.

The applicant was granted two increments in 1996 as per his request dated November 18, 1996.

His probation, initially for two years, was extended for another year due to adverse entries in his Performance Appraisal Report and Annual Confidential Report for 1995-96, finally concluding on July 30, 1998.

The applicant alleges that other officers, including Mr. Syed Mohd. Noman, who were junior or on probation, were promoted to Deputy Manager (Accounts) bypassing him.

The respondents contended that the applicant's appeal was time-barred and that he was not eligible for promotion under the May 9, 1988 circular because he acquired the qualification during probation and did not complete one year of service.

They also stated that the applicant was found unsuitable for the post of Deputy Manager by the Selection Committee on July 23, 1998, and that the circular of August 20, 1996, superseded the earlier one.

The applicant sought to set aside the orders dated June 15, 2020, and November 2, 2020, and to advance his promotion.

Whether the applicant's request for promotion to Deputy Manager (Accounts) and subsequent higher promotions, based on the May 9, 1988 circular, is maintainable, considering the superseding circular of August 20, 1996, and the completion of his probation period.

Whether the applicant is entitled to the benefit of upgradation at par with other employees, specifically Mr. Syed Mohd. Noman, when their selection was through a different promotional quota and the applicant was found unsuitable.

The NSIC office order dated May 9, 1988, regarding the grant of upgradation to the next higher grade for employees acquiring professional qualifications, which stipulated eligibility on completion of a minimum of one year's service and successful completion of probation at the time of qualifying.

The NSIC circular dated August 20, 1996, which superseded earlier provisions, including the May 9, 1988 circular, and provided incentives in the form of two additional increments for acquiring higher qualifications, applicable only to qualifications acquired on or after the said date.

The principle that repeated representations do not give rise to a fresh cause of action.

The court found that the applicant acquired the ICWA qualification in December 1995, prior to the August 20, 1996 circular coming into force, which meant the 1996 circular was not applicable to him.

The court also determined that the applicant did not meet the conditions of the earlier May 9, 1988 office order, as he had not successfully completed his probation period by December 1995; his probation concluded on July 30, 1998, due to an extension based on adverse remarks.

The court noted the ambiguity created by the 1996 policy for employees like the applicant, but highlighted that the applicant had opted for and received the benefit of two advance increments under the 1996 policy at his own request in November 1996.

The court further differentiated the applicant's comparison with other employees, such as Mr. Syed Mohd. Noman, stating that promotions through selection via promotion quota constitute a different source of appointment, rendering a direct comparison of senior/junior in such cases inapplicable.

Additionally, the applicant had participated in the selection process but was not found suitable for the post of Deputy Manager.

The court also deemed the application to suffer from abnormal delay and latches, given that the issue was raised after 25 years.

It concluded that the applicant was not eligible for the relief sought under either the 1988 or 1996 policies due to his probationary status at the time of acquiring the qualification and his election to accept the benefits of the 1996 policy.

The court also held that comparing his case with employees promoted through different quotas was inappropriate, especially since he was found unsuitable in the selection process.

No costs were awarded.