Restoring corruption cases against Bengaluru ACP, Supreme Court rules High Courts cannot conduct 'mini-trials' of evidence to quash FIRs during investigation.

Six FIRs were registered against the Respondents (Assistant Commissioner of Police and Police Inspector) alleging offenses under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 384 r/w 34 of the IPC.

The High Court of Karnataka, exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, quashed these FIRs on 08.09.2021.

The High Court’s decision was based on findings that there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIRs, a lack of prima facie material regarding "demand and acceptance" of bribes, allegations of departmental malafides, and that some FIRs were repetitive.

The State of Karnataka appealed, arguing that the High Court conducted an impermissible "mini-trial" at the investigation stage.

1. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC by quashing FIRs based on an evidentiary evaluation of "demand and recovery" and "delay" at the investigation stage.

2. Whether the registration of subsequent FIRs under the PC Act on the same set of allegations previously registered under the IPC constitutes an impermissible "second FIR".

3. Whether High Courts should maintain a "hands-off" approach in corruption cases during the investigation stage.

The court primarily applied Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, establishing that quashing powers must be exercised sparingly and only when the FIR fails to disclose a cognizable offense.

It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which sets the exceptions for quashing.

It further applied the doctrine from State v. K. Rangayya, holding that "demand or solicitation" suffices for an offense under Section 7 of the PC Act even without actual exchange of money.

Punit Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi, which states that delay in FIR is a matter of trial and not a ground for quashing.

The court also cited State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh regarding zero tolerance for corruption.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the High Court traversed beyond established contours of Section 482 by sifting through evidence and assessing probabilities, which are functions reserved for the trial court.

The Court noted that the absence of physical recovery or direct payment to a specific officer is a matter for discharge or trial, not for quashing an FIR, as Section 7 of the PC Act covers "attempts" and "solicitation" through intermediaries.

Regarding the "second FIR" issue, the Court held that if a subsequent FIR pertains to a larger scope of corruption, it cannot be nipped in the bud.

The Court emphasized that in corruption cases, High Courts must maintain a "hands-off" approach to allow investigations to reach their logical conclusion, even if malafides are alleged.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court’s orders quashing the FIRs. The FIRs were reinstated, though the Respondents were granted liberty to pursue legal remedies (such as discharge) uninfluenced by these observations. The Court ordered that investigation into these corruption charges must proceed in the interest of society.