Resumption proceedings initiated 74 years after alienation cannot be sustained due to delay.

The land in Sy. No. 50, later New Sy. No. 63, measuring 2 acres 13 guntas, was granted to Pillaga in 1937 and alienated in 1944 and 1947, followed by subsequent sale transactions

In 2018, respondent No. 5, Adinarayanaswamy, claiming to be a family member of the original grantee, initiated resumption proceedings.

The Assistant Commissioner ordered resumption; on appeal, the Deputy Commissioner set that order aside.

The petitioners sought certiorari to quash the Deputy Commissioner’s order and also requested protection of their alleged possession.

1. Whether the Deputy Commissioner’s decision to set aside the Assistant Commissioner’s resumption order warranted interference, given the substantial delay in initiating resumption proceedings.

2. Whether the petitioners could obtain protection of their alleged possession in this writ petition, although they were not parties to the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

The Court applied the principle that an extraordinary and unexplained delay in initiating proceedings may justify rejecting a claim for resumption on grounds of laches.

The Court cited no specific statute or precedent as the basis for this conclusion.

It also declined to grant possession-related relief where the petitioners had not been parties to the underlying proceedings and had not sought leave to prosecute the writ petition on behalf of their alleged possession.

The petition was brought under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The Court noted that the resumption proceedings were initiated in 2018, nearly 74 years after the original alienations, and found no basis to interfere with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision setting aside the Assistant Commissioner’s resumption order.

As to possession, the petitioners were neither applicants before the Assistant Commissioner nor parties before the Deputy Commissioner, and they had not sought leave to pursue the writ petition on behalf of their alleged possession; accordingly, the Court declined to protect it.

It refused the request to protect the petitioners’ alleged possession.

Any interim order was discharged, and pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of.