Retrospective Withdrawal of Superannuation Protection and Recovery of Salary Without Natural Justice Is Impermissible

The Petitioner, a Reader at Bharati College, was appointed Director of the Directorate of Hindi Medium Implementation (DHMI) on September 3, 2007

Before joining, she sought clarity on her retirement age, as teachers retired at 65 while non-teachers retired at 62

On December 27, 2007, the University’s Executive Council (EC) passed Resolution No. 126, treating her post as a "teaching post" for retirement purposes specifically because she came from the teaching fraternity

Relying on this, she allowed her lien at Bharati College to lapse

Years later, following a 2014 UGC communication disapproving the 65-year retirement age for the DHMI Director, the University issued an order in March 2017 retrospectively superannuating her as of April 30, 2012

The University re-characterized her five years of completed service as "contractual" and sought to recover approximately ₹38.9 Lakhs in "excess" salary

1. Whether EC Resolution No. 126 operated as a case-specific protection regarding the Petitioner’s retirement age based on promissory estoppel

2. Whether the University could retrospectively withdraw service benefits and re-characterize regular service as contractual without natural justice

3. Whether the University is legally entitled to recover alleged excess payments from a retired employee in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation

The court applied the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel, which prevents a public authority from resiling from a representation if a person has altered their position to their detriment based on that promise

The Court distinguished between ultra vires acts and "irregular" exercises of power, noting that the EC held the Power of Relaxation under Rule 22/18 of the University Non-Teaching Employees Rules

The court applied the principles from State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih, which prohibits recovery from retired employees when it is inequitable or where no fraud/misrepresentation exists

The Court further relied on D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, affirming that pension and salary are earned rights, not bounties

The Court reasoned that Resolution No. 126 was not a general policy change but a case-specific assurance tailored to the Petitioner’s "teaching fraternity" status

Because the Petitioner allowed her lien to lapse based on this formal communication, the University was estopped from withdrawing the protection after she could no longer return to her original post

The Court found the University’s retrospective action—treating her as retired five years prior—to be a "post facto re-characterisation" that lacked any legal basis, as no contract existed at the time

The UGC's 2014 disapproval was found inapplicable to the Petitioner's specific circumstances since the University failed to disclose the subsisting lien and specific EC assurance to the UGC

The Court held that imposing such adverse civil consequences without a hearing violated the principles of natural justice

Since the Petitioner did not commit fraud, recovery was deemed impermissible under the Rafiq Masih framework

The Court held that the Petitioner must be treated as having retired on April 30, 2017.

The Court directed the University to: (i) release all unpaid salary and increments up to April 2017; (ii) recompute retiral benefits based on the 2017 retirement date; (iii) cease all recovery efforts and refund any adjusted amounts; and (iv) pay interest at 9% per annum on all delayed payments, increasing to 12% if not paid within six weeks.

The ruling was clarified as a case-specific relief that does not establish a general precedent for the DHMI Director post.