Revenue officers cannot reopen Bengal land-retention proceedings decades later using record-revision powers, Calcutta High Court rules

Bijoy Krishna Pal was allotted 2.71 acres, including the disputed plot, under a 1951 compromise decree in a partition suit.

Of that land, 0.68 acres was recorded as vested, while the remaining 2.02 acres was recorded in Khanda Khatian No. 2641 as retained land.

The disputed plot passed through successive transfers to the petitioner, who purchased it in 2002 and sought mutation.

A later proceeding, BR Case No. 41 of 1985, purported to determine retained and vested land afresh; the BL&LRO relied on that proceeding to treat the petitioner’s purchase as post-vesting and refuse mutation.

The Tribunal dismissed her challenge.

The High Court considered the land records and the materials concerning the earlier and later proceedings

1. Whether the revenue officer could initiate a de novo proceeding to redetermine retained and vested land under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, after final publication of the record-of-rights.

2. Whether the BL&LRO’s refusal of mutation, based on BR Case No. 41 of 1985, and the Tribunal’s decision upholding that refusal could stand.

Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 provide for vesting of estates and intermediary rights, subject to the retention provisions in Section 6; Section 6(5) provides for determination of retainable land where the intermediary has not exercised the prescribed choice, after an opportunity to be heard.

Section 44(2a) empowers an authorised officer to revise an entry in a finally published record-of-rights, after hearing interested persons and recording reasons; it does not confer power to reopen the vesting process or conduct a de novo determination of retained land.

Section 14T(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 confers a distinct power to determine the extent of land liable to vest under that Act.

The Court applied the principle that a statutory authority may exercise only powers conferred by statute and must exercise them in the prescribed manner.

It also considered CAG of India v. K.S. Jagannathan, State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, West Bengal Government Employees (Food and Supplies) Cooperative Housing Societies Ltd. v. Sulekha Pal (Dey), Rajbala Barik v. State of West Bengal, and Sankalchan Jayachandbhai Patel v. Vithalbhai Patel, distinguishing them or finding them of limited assistance on the facts.

The Court found that the earlier records distinguished the 0.68 acres recorded as vested from the 2.02 acres recorded as retained, which included the land from which the petitioner’s plot derived.

BR Case No. 41 of 1985 was initiated long after final publication of the record-of-rights and purported to reopen the determination of retained and vested land.

Because Section 44(2a) permits revision of entries, not a fresh determination of retention, the proceeding exceeded the revenue officer’s statutory authority.

The consequential corrections and the BL&LRO’s order in Misc. Case No. 10 of 2009 therefore lacked jurisdiction.

The Tribunal erred by upholding those actions without addressing the limits of the statutory power.

It directed the respondents to mutate the petitioner’s name in respect of the purchased plot within eight weeks of communication of the judgment, subject to completion of any applicable formalities; there was no order as to costs.