Review dismissed as Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories retains protection over “REDDY” mark in pharma business

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (“DRL”) instituted CS(OS) 2194/2003 against Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“RPL”) concerning RPL’s use of the expression “REDDY” in the pharmaceutical business.

DRL sought, inter alia, injunction against passing off, copyright infringement, rendition of accounts, damages and delivery-up.

The learned Single Judge granted a permanent injunction against RPL on 13 September 2013, leading RPL to file RFA(OS) 138/2013.

During the pendency of the appeal, DRL initiated rectification proceedings before the IPAB for removal of RPL’s registered “REDDY” mark.

The IPAB directed removal of the mark by order dated 29 October 2013, which RPL challenged in W.P.(C) 654/2014.

The Division Bench first upheld the IPAB’s order and thereafter dismissed RFA(OS) 138/2013 by a common judgment dated 18 May 2026.

RPL filed the present review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the judgment contained errors apparent on the face of the record, including improper reliance on the IPAB’s findings, erroneous assessment of DRL’s goodwill and prior use, reliance on an interim order, and invocation of Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Whether the common judgment improperly treated the IPAB’s order as evidence establishing DRL’s goodwill or reputation in the passing-off action, thereby constituting an error apparent on the face of the record?

Whether the finding of goodwill and reputation was based merely on the Agency Agreement and an allegedly subsequent 1997 invoice, contrary to the law governing prior use and the decision in Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana?

Whether reliance on the interim order dated 26 August 2004 vitiated the final judgment and constituted an error apparent on the face of the record?

Whether the Division Bench erred by referring to Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 when the IPAB had proceeded under Section 158 of the Companies Act, 1956?

Whether the review petitioner established grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC?

The Court applied the limited scope of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, under which review is maintainable only for discovery of new evidence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or other sufficient reason; review cannot be used for rehearing or reappreciating evidence.

Under the law of passing off, goodwill, reputation, prior use and misrepresentation may be established through a cumulative or “mosaic” of credible evidence, including sales records, advertisements, publications, admissions and other contemporaneous documents.

The Court relied on S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, which recognises that long and extensive use supported by a “plethora of evidence” can establish goodwill and distinct reputation.

The Court considered Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd., but distinguished it on facts because that case involved unproved summaries, whereas the present case involved primary and contemporaneous evidence.

The Court also applied Sections 35, 57, 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: Section 35 protects bona fide use of a person’s own name or place of business, while Section 57 permits rectification where a mark is wrongly remaining on the Register, assessed with reference to the statutory grounds under Sections 9 and 11.

The limited scope of review was additionally considered in light of Malleeswari v. K. Suguna.

The Court held that the IPAB’s order was not treated as the evidentiary basis for DRL’s goodwill in the passing-off action.

The writ proceedings concerning rectification were decided first, and the appeal was thereafter independently examined on the evidence relating to goodwill, reputation, prior use and surrounding circumstances.

The finding of goodwill was based on DW-1’s unqualified admission, newspaper publications, sales invoices, advertising invoices and other documentary material; the Agency Agreement merely corroborated the admission and demonstrated DRL’s knowledge of RPL’s business and market presence.

The alleged 1997 invoice was not treated as the sole basis for determining prior use, and the reference to the 2004 interim order did not form the foundation of the final decision.

On the rectification issue, the Court held that even if the IPAB had incorrectly referred to Section 158 of the Companies Act, 1956, its findings of confusion, false trade connection, dishonest adoption and absence of bona fide proprietorship independently justified removal of the mark under the Trade Marks Act.

The review grounds therefore amounted to an attempt to reargue and reappreciate matters already decided, rather than demonstrating any patent error.

The review petition was accordingly dismissed.

The clerical error in paragraph 201 of the earlier judgment—mentioning W.P.(C) 6461/2018 instead of W.P.(C) 654/2014—was corrected without affecting the substantive judgment.

The application under Section 340 CrPC was directed to be listed before the concerned roster Bench, subject to administrative orders of the Chief Justice.