Revisional Court cannot re-appreciate evidence to substitute findings on bona fide requirement under DRC Act.

The Petitioner (landlord) filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control (DRC) Act, 1958, against the Respondents (tenants).

The Petitioner sought recovery of the tenanted premises on the ground of bona fide requirement to establish a "Yoga Research and Training Centre" and facilities for publishing yoga literature.

The Petitioner claimed that while he possessed the upper floors, access was restricted to a narrow 2.5-foot back lane, necessitating the ground-floor tenanted premises for main-road access for international followers.

The Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dismissed the eviction petition on 12.09.2013, concluding that the bona fide requirement was not established.

The Petitioner challenged this order through the present revision petition.

1. Whether the findings of the learned ARC regarding the lack of bona fide requirement suffered from perversity or material irregularity warranting interference under revisional jurisdiction.

2. Whether the High Court, under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, can re-appreciate evidence to substitute the findings of the Rent Controller.

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, 1958, which governs the High Court's power of revision in eviction matters.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court precedents of Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, which establish that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory, not appellate.

The doctrine holds that the High Court’s role is limited to satisfying itself on the legality of the "decision-making process" and cannot involve a "roving inquiry" or re-appreciation of evidence unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Court observed that the ARC’s decision was based on a detailed appreciation of oral and documentary evidence.

The ARC found that the Petitioner failed to produce any contemporaneous material—such as publicity pamphlets, advertisements, or records of foreign visitors—to prove that yoga camps were actually being conducted or planned.

Furthermore, the Petitioner did not establish that his written works required additional space for publication, especially since the legal notice prior to the petition was silent on these activities.

Regarding the "narrow access" argument, the Court noted that the Petitioner failed to provide site plans or photographs to substantiate the claim that the 2.5-foot lane was inadequate.

The High Court held that the Petitioner was essentially seeking a "fresh appreciation of evidence," which is forbidden under Section 25-B(8).

The Court affirmed that the ARC's findings were founded on a reasonable assessment of the material on record and that the Petitioner failed to prove a bona fide requirement.

No order as to costs was made.