Revisional courts cannot reappreciate evidence where suitable subsequent accommodation satisfies the bona fide requirement.

The petitioner-landlord challenged, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the orders dated 4 May 2019 and 7 May 2019 by which the Additional Rent Controller dismissed two eviction petitions under Section 14(1)(e) concerning Shop Nos. 1 and 3 on the ground floor of Property No. 11/4, West Patel Nagar, New Delhi.

The eviction petitions were based on the bona fide commercial and residential requirements of the petitioner and her dependent family members.

During the pendency of the proceedings, Shop No. 2 in the same property, measuring approximately 9 feet × 14 feet, was vacated and obtained by the petitioner’s family.

The petitioner’s son and daughter-in-law admitted that they had opened an LIC/insurance office in Shop No. 2, which was the same purpose for which the subject premises had been sought.

Although client lists demonstrated that the son and daughter-in-law had a substantial number of clients, the ARC held that the commercial requirement had been satisfied by the availability and use of Shop No. 2.

The ARC also noted that the original petitioner had died during the proceedings and that no subsisting residential requirement could thereafter be attributed to her.

Whether, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, the High Court could interfere with the ARC’s finding that the bona fide commercial requirement was satisfied because Shop No. 2 had become available and was being used for the pleaded purpose.

Whether the son and daughter-in-law’s substantial client base established a continuing bona fide requirement for the subject premises notwithstanding the availability and actual use of Shop No. 2.

Whether the original petitioner’s residential requirement survived after her death during the pendency of the eviction proceedings.

The Court applied Sections 14(1)(e) and 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Section 14(1)(e) requires the landlord to establish a bona fide requirement of the premises and the absence of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

The proviso to Section 25-B(8) confers limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, not appellate jurisdiction.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, absence of adjudication, or an error apparent on the face of the record; the High Court cannot substitute its view merely because another view is possible.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, which reaffirmed the restricted scope of revision under Section 25-B(8).

The Court found that the ARC had properly considered the evidence, including the admissions of the petitioner’s son, daughter-in-law and grandson, the photographs of Shop No. 2, its location and dimensions, and its actual use as an LIC/insurance office.

Shop No. 2 was in the same property, on the same floor, was substantially the same size as the subject premises, and was being used for the very purpose pleaded in the eviction petitions.

Therefore, its availability was not merely the existence of unrelated or unsuitable accommodation but a subsequent event directly satisfying the pleaded commercial requirement.

The client lists established a large volume of work but did not, by themselves, prove that an additional premises was still bona fide required after Shop No. 2 had been obtained and utilised.

The petitioner’s challenge consequently sought a reappreciation of evidence and substitution of the ARC’s conclusion, which was impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8).

The finding regarding the residential requirement was also upheld because the original petitioner had died and no independent ground was advanced to challenge that conclusion.

It held that the ARC’s conclusion that the bona fide commercial requirement had been satisfied by Shop No. 2 was supported by the evidence and disclosed no perversity, illegality, material irregularity or error apparent on the face of the record.

The petitioner’s reliance on the large client base did not justify interference, as it would require impermissible reappreciation of evidence.

Both revision petitions were dismissed, and the pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.