Revisional courts should not reappreciate evidence to disturb concurrent findings absent patent error or perversity.

The complainant, an officer of the Bihar State Housing Co-operative Federation, alleged that the Federation had advanced a loan of ₹1.5 crore to a housing society whose Secretary was the original petitioner, Dharmanand Jha. Jha issued three cheques for ₹6 lakh each; they were dishonoured for insufficient funds, and payment was not made after statutory notice.

The Magistrate convicted him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), sentencing him to one year’s simple imprisonment and directing payment of ₹18 lakh as compensation. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In revision, the petitioner argued, among other things, that the cheques were security cheques, amounts had been deposited in certificate proceedings, and the society and its President had not been joined as accused.

Dharmanand Jha died during the revision, and his wife, Beena Jha, was substituted.

1. Whether the concurrent conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the NI Act disclosed a legal or factual error warranting interference in revision, given the petitioner’s defences concerning security cheques, repayment and certificate proceedings.

2. Whether the conviction could be sustained when the petitioner argued that the society and its President had not been impleaded and that the requirements of Section 141 of the NI Act were not established.

Section 138 of the NI Act provides for criminal liability where a cheque issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability is dishonoured and the statutory requirements are met.

The petitioner relied on Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578, concerning whether a cheque represents a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment, and S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, concerning liability under Section 141 of the NI Act.

The Court’s stated basis for deciding the revision was the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC: it is directed to correcting a patent defect or error of jurisdiction or law, and does not ordinarily permit a fresh reappraisal of evidence or interference with concurrent findings absent exceptional circumstances. The Court relied on Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204, and Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330.

The Court noted that the trial court had considered the points raised in revision and given a reasoned decision, and that the appellate court had reappreciated the evidence and upheld that decision.

Applying the limited revisional standard, it found no legal substance in the petitioner’s arguments and no basis to disturb the concurrent findings. The judgment does not separately analyse the merits of the Section 141 argument or the alleged repayments; it rejects the revision on the basis of the concurrent findings and the restricted scope of revision.

Any pending interlocutory application was disposed of, and the trial-court record was directed to be returned to the concerned court.