Revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) cannot substitute the Rent Controller’s assessment absent perversity or illegality.

The petitioners-tenants invoked Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, read with Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the order dated 10 July 2018 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Shahdara, in ARC No. 981/2016.

The learned ARC dismissed the petitioners’ application for leave to defend and passed an eviction order concerning Shop No. 258, Anaj Mandi, Shahdara, Delhi, in favour of the respondents.

The petitioners confined their challenge to the alleged availability of two alternative premises: (i) a tenanted office at 4648/21, Daryaganj, New Delhi, from which Respondent No. 1 was carrying on professional activities; and (ii) Property No. 283A, First Floor, situated behind the subject premises, which was alleged to be available to Respondent No. 1 for use as a professional office.

The ARC held that the Daryaganj premises was tenanted in the name of Respondent No. 1’s mother and could not be equated with premises owned and independently available to Respondent No. 1. It further held that the plea concerning Property No. 283A was belated and unsupported by documents, a site plan, or photographs demonstrating Respondent No. 1’s possession or share in that property.

Whether the tenanted premises at 4648/21, Daryaganj, constituted suitable alternative accommodation such that Respondent No. 1’s claimed bona fide requirement for the subject premises raised a triable issue.

Whether the alleged availability of Property No. 283A, First Floor, raised a triable issue notwithstanding that the plea was introduced only in the additional rejoinder affidavit and was unsupported by material establishing Respondent No. 1’s possession, ownership, or availability of the premises.

Whether the ARC’s refusal to grant leave to defend disclosed perversity, patent illegality, material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or any other ground warranting interference under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

The Court applied Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over the decision-making process of the Rent Controller, and Article 227 of the Constitution.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that Section 25-B(8) does not confer appellate jurisdiction and that the High Court should not substitute its own assessment for that of the Rent Controller merely because another view is possible.

The same principle was reiterated with reference to Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285.

Interference is permissible only where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, absence of adjudication, jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or a wholly unreasonable conclusion.

The Court held that the ARC had expressly considered Respondent No. 1’s use of the Daryaganj premises but reasonably found it unsuitable as an equivalent alternative because it was a tenanted premises standing in the name of his mother, not an independently owned or controlled premises of Respondent No. 1.

The petitioners’ argument merely invited a reassessment of the suitability of that accommodation, which was impermissible in limited revisional jurisdiction.

Regarding Property No. 283A, the ARC had not rejected the plea solely because it was raised belatedly; it also examined its substance and found that the petitioners had produced no site plan, document, or photograph showing that the property belonged to, was possessed by, or was available to Respondent No. 1.

The ARC’s findings were therefore based on both the procedural belatedness of the plea and the absence of proof regarding its availability and suitability.

Since the ARC had considered the material and given reasons on both alleged alternative accommodations, no perversity, illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional infirmity was established.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the pending applications were disposed of accordingly.