Revisional jurisdiction under Section 25B(8) cannot reappreciate facts where leave to defend raises triable issues.

The petitioner-landlord filed an eviction petition under the summary procedure prescribed by Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”).

The learned ARC-01 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, by order dated 11 December 2023 in Eviction Petition No. 132/2022, granted the respondent-tenant leave to defend on the ground that a triable issue arose regarding the petitioner’s availability of alternate accommodation.

The ARC relied upon disputes concerning the number of shops in the premises, the absence of a site plan showing their occupation, the petitioner’s plea that certain shops had fallen to his sister’s share, and the alleged occupation of another shop by his son without supporting documentation.

The petitioner challenged the grant of leave to defend under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, contending that the ARC had relied on bald and speculative assertions and had failed to determine whether the alleged accommodation was reasonably suitable.

1. Whether the ARC erred in granting the respondent leave to defend on the basis of an alleged triable issue concerning the petitioner’s alternate accommodation.

2. Whether, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, the High Court could reappreciate the factual disputes concerning the number, ownership, occupation, and suitability of the shops.

3. Whether the ARC’s order suffered from jurisdictional error, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference.

Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act confers a limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction on the High Court over orders passed by the Rent Controller; it does not confer appellate jurisdiction or permit substitution of the High Court’s view merely because another view is possible.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the Court held that interference is warranted only for an error apparent on the face of the record, absence of adjudication, jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an unreasonable conclusion founded on an erroneous legal premise.

The same approach was reiterated in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285.

At the leave-to-defend stage under Section 25-B, the Controller is not required to finally adjudicate the truth of competing factual assertions; leave should be granted where the defence raises a real and substantial issue requiring evidence, as held in Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, (1982) 3 SCC 270.

The High Court found that the ARC had identified specific factual circumstances capable of raising a bona fide triable issue: the petitioner had not disclosed the total number of shops in the eviction petition; the parties disputed whether there were 11 or 15 shops; no complete site plan showing existing occupation had been filed; the plea regarding division of shops between the petitioner and his sister had not been pleaded in the eviction petition or supported by particulars; and the alleged occupation of one shop by the petitioner’s son was unsupported by documentary material.

These matters were not merely conclusory assertions and could require evidence regarding availability and suitability of alternate accommodation.

Determining their factual correctness would require the High Court to reappreciate the rival claims and assess the suitability of the alleged accommodation, which was impermissible in the restricted revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8).

Since the ARC had applied the correct threshold—whether the defence disclosed a triable issue rather than whether it was ultimately proved—the impugned order disclosed no jurisdictional error, patent illegality, material irregularity, or perversity.

The petitioner’s challenge would require impermissible reappreciation of disputed facts, and no ground for interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act was established.

Accordingly, the revision petition was dismissed, and any pending applications were also dismissed.