Road widening: MP High Court upholds removal of obstructing portion of Ujjain Shahi Masjid

The petitioners claimed an interest in and administration of Shahi Masjid, Ujjain, a registered Waqf property situated at Municipal No. 524, Khasra No. 2072, Chatri Chowk.

The Ujjain Municipal Corporation issued notices dated 14.08.2026, 25.08.2026, 27.08.2026 and a final notice/order dated 01.09.2026 under Section 305 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, proposing removal of the portion of the mosque falling within the proposed 15-metre road line.

The Corporation asserted that the road formed part of the Ujjain Development Plan, 2035 and was required to be widened in the larger public interest, particularly considering the Shahi Sawari, Peshwai and Simhastha 2028.

The Court heard both petitions together and decided them by a common order.

The Court applied Section 305 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, under which land projecting beyond the regular line of a public street may vest in the Corporation upon removal or setback, subject to reasonable compensation for resulting loss or damage.

Sections 322 and 323, concerning obstruction in streets and activities affecting Corporation streets, were also considered, but the Court relied on authorities holding that Section 305 governs removal of structures falling within the sanctioned road line.

The Court applied Articles 14, 25, 26 and 300A of the Constitution: equality prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory State action; religious freedom is subject to public order, morality, health and other constitutional provisions; religious denominations may manage religious affairs and property in accordance with law; and property may be taken only by authority of law.

Relying on In Re Manoj Tiberwal Akash, the Court held that road-widening authorities must verify official records, conduct demarcation, issue written notice, consider objections by a speaking order, provide reasonable notice before adverse action, and acquire land in accordance with law where existing public land is insufficient.

Gulam Kadar Ahmadbhai Menon v. Surat Municipal Corporation established that religious places do not enjoy absolute immunity from acquisition or removal, although authorities must balance religious significance against public interest; a place of particular and integral religious significance requires greater protection.

Mohammad Ali Khan v. Special Land Acquisition Officer was relied upon for the principle that Article 25 protects the freedom to practise religion but does not create an absolute right to practise at a particular site.

The Court also relied on Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation and related authorities for the binding effect of a development plan, the Corporation’s power under Section 305, automatic vesting upon satisfaction of statutory conditions, and the validity of compensation after vesting.

The Court found that the Corporation had acted pursuant to the Ujjain Development Plan, 2035 and that the proposed widening served a substantial public purpose involving traffic management and public safety during major religious events.

The record showed that similar portions of ten temples and one mosque had already been removed on the same road and that action had been taken against approximately eighty religious structures across Ujjain; consequently, the Court rejected the allegation of discriminatory treatment under Article 14.

It further held that the petitioners had received notice and an opportunity to submit objections, which were considered before the impugned order was passed.

The Court distinguished the mosque’s religious function from the preservation of every component of the structure, observing that the proposed action concerned only the obstructing portion and did not establish that the petitioners’ ability to practise Islam would be extinguished.

Consistent with the cited authorities, Article 25 did not confer an absolute right to retain a particular place or structure where lawful public action required its removal.

The Court also accepted that Section 305 provided statutory authority for removal of the portion falling within the regular road line and that compensation through FAR/TDR addressed the property consequences under Article 300A.

The suggested alternative use of the nearby garden or opposite property was rejected as factually unsupported and impracticable.

Finally, disputed questions concerning the competing committees’ authority and locus standi, together with the public-interest character of the project, weighed against exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction.

The impugned notices and final order were issued under a valid road-widening plan, after notice and consideration of objections, and the Corporation was legally competent to remove the obstructing portion under Section 305 of the 1956 Act.

The Court found no ground for interference under Article 226 and dismissed both writ petitions, leaving the Corporation’s proposed action undisturbed.