Rule 14(ii) dismissal is unsustainable without cogent reasons demonstrating that departmental inquiry was impracticable.

The applicant, a Railway Technician Grade-I, was dismissed from service on 01.09.2020 under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, without issuance of a charge memorandum or conduct of a regular departmental enquiry.

Two FIRs were registered against him under Section 420 IPC based on allegations that he had collected money by falsely promising railway appointments.

The applicant’s departmental appeal was rejected on 02.03.2022 by a brief order stating that no new facts had been raised and that, considering the seriousness of the charges, the penalty was upheld.

His revision petition was similarly rejected on 18.07.2022 without independent examination of the legality of invoking Rule 14(ii).

Whether the Disciplinary Authority validly invoked Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, corresponding to Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, by dispensing with the departmental enquiry?

Whether the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority demonstrated, on objective and specific material, that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct a departmental enquiry?

Whether the appellate and revisional authorities discharged their duty by independently considering the legality of the invocation of Rule 14(ii)?

What relief and consequential directions should follow from the invalid dismissal order?

Rule 9 of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Article 311(2) of the Constitution establish a regular departmental enquiry as the ordinary requirement before dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.

Rule 14(ii), reflecting Article 311(2)(b), permits dispensing with an enquiry only where the competent authority is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold one and records the reasons for that satisfaction in writing.

In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, the Supreme Court held that the power must not be exercised lightly, arbitrarily or to avoid an enquiry.

Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385, requires the satisfaction to be supported by objective material and not merely by the authority’s ipse dixit.

Hari Niwas Gupta v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeals Nos. 3106–3107/2017, reiterates that reasons must exist at the time of the decision and cannot be supplied retrospectively.

Ved Mitter Gill v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2015) 8 SCC 86, recognises circumstances such as terrorisation or intimidation of witnesses, or an atmosphere of violence or general indiscipline, as situations that may justify dispensing with an enquiry, provided the factual foundation is established.

The Tribunal held that the first requirement—that the alleged conduct, if proved, could warrant a major penalty—was satisfied at the threshold, without determining the applicant’s guilt.

However, the second and third requirements were not met.

Although the Disciplinary Authority formally recorded that an enquiry was not reasonably practicable, its reasons principally consisted of the registration of FIRs, newspaper reports, the alleged disappearance of the applicant, the seriousness of the allegations, the need for expeditious action and his custody.

These matters could justify investigation or other interim service action, but did not establish an actual impediment to conducting a departmental enquiry.

The order did not identify any witness who had been threatened or intimidated, any atmosphere of violence or indiscipline, any unavailable evidence, or any other concrete circumstance making the enquiry impracticable.

The Tribunal distinguished Abhishek Kumar, where there was specific material showing that key witnesses had been terrorised and would not be able to depose freely.

It further found that the appellate and revisional orders were cryptic and failed to independently examine the foundational question of whether Rule 14(ii) had been validly invoked.

The dismissal order dated 01.09.2020, the appellate order dated 02.03.2022 and the revisional order dated 18.07.2022 were set aside.

The OA was partly allowed, and the matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority.

The respondents were permitted, if considered appropriate, to frame charges and conduct a regular enquiry in accordance with law, and were directed to determine in accordance with law the applicant’s service, pensionary and consequential benefits for the period from dismissal until the date on which he would otherwise have retired.

No order as to costs was made.