Rule 43(b) Prohibits Initiating Post-Retirement Departmental Proceedings for Events Occurring Beyond Four Years.

The petitioner was originally dismissed from service on 19.07.2012.

The petitioner challenged this in W.P.(S) No. 2791 of 2018, where the Court set aside the dismissal and directed the respondents to initiate a fresh departmental proceeding by furnishing a charge-sheet within six weeks of 28.11.2022.

The petitioner appealed the observation that he should not be reinstated; the Division Bench subsequently held in L.P.A. No. 12 of 2023 that the petitioner should be deemed reinstated from the date of his 2012 termination.

The petitioner superannuated on 31.07.2023.

Despite the court’s six-week deadline, the respondents issued a charge-sheet and initiated departmental proceedings only on 23.11.2023—four months after his retirement and nearly a year after the court order—concerning events that occurred in 2012.

1. Whether the departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner after his retirement is legally sustainable under Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules.

2. Whether the initiation of proceedings for an event occurring more than four years prior to the date of initiation is barred by limitation.

Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules, specifically Proviso (a)(ii), which restricts the government’s power to initiate departmental proceedings against a retired employee for events that occurred more than four years before the institution of such proceedings.

Principle established by the Division Bench in the petitioner's own case (L.P.A. No. 12 of 2023) and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Karunakar, which mandates that upon the quashing of a termination order, an employee is deemed reinstated for the purposes of a fair inquiry.

The court reasoned that since the petitioner retired on 31.07.2023, any subsequent disciplinary action must strictly adhere to Rule 43(b) of the Jharkhand Pension Rules.

The impugned order of initiation was dated 23.11.2023, whereas the underlying event occurred on 19.07.2012.

The court observed that the "four-year rule" under Proviso (a)(ii) acts as a strict bar: the department cannot initiate proceedings for events that took place more than four years prior to the date the charge-sheet is issued.

Although a prior Single Judge order had granted the State permission to proceed, it explicitly mandated doing so within six weeks of 28.11.2022; the respondents, however, "slept over the matter" for nearly a year.

Consequently, the power to initiate the proceeding lapsed as the four-year limitation period (calculated backwards from 2023) did not cover the 2012 incident.

The writ application was allowed, and the order dated 23.11.2023 was quashed. The Court directed that the petitioner be deemed reinstated from the date of his original termination until his retirement and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, including full back wages.