Rurban LPG distributorship requires a Census-defined urban location; master-plan inclusion alone is insufficient.

The petitioner applied for an LPG distributorship at Namrup, Dibrugarh, under the “Rurban” category and Open Category pursuant to IOCL’s advertisement dated 12 June 2018. He offered leased land situated at Nagamati Kheremia Gaon for construction of the showroom and godown. After being provisionally selected in the draw of lots held on 25 July 2018, he deposited the required security amount of ₹50,000.

IOCL subsequently obtained reports from the Namrup Town Committee and the Circle Officer, which stated that the offered land was not within the existing demarcated limits of the Namrup Town Committee as on the last date of application, 13 July 2018.

Although the land fell within the larger Namrup Master Plan area, Nagamati Kheremia Gaon was classified thereunder as part of the rural zone.

IOCL rejected the petitioner’s candidature by email dated 29 September 2018 and forfeited the ₹50,000 security deposit. The petitioner challenged that decision under Article 226 of the Constitution; an interim status quo order was maintained during the proceedings.

Whether land situated at Nagamati Kheremia Gaon satisfied the requirement of being located in an “urban area” for appointment of a “Rurban Vitrak” under the Unified Guidelines for Selection of LPG Distributors, October 2017.

Whether IOCL was justified in cancelling the petitioner’s provisional selection and forfeiting the security deposit of ₹50,000 on the ground that the offered land was outside the urban/town limits of the advertised location.

Whether inclusion of Nagamati Kheremia Gaon within the Namrup Final Master Plan was sufficient to characterise the offered land as urban land for the purpose of LPG distributorship selection.

The Court applied Clause 1(c) of the Unified Guidelines for Selection of LPG Distributors, October 2017, which defines the various types of distributorships.

A “Rurban Vitrak” must be located in an urban area and serve customers in specified rural areas, generally within 15 kilometres of the municipal limits of the distributorship location.

The expression “urban area” was taken from the Census 2011 definition, under which an urban area comprises either a statutory town—such as a municipality, corporation, cantonment board or notified town area committee—or a place satisfying all three criteria of a minimum population of 5,000, at least 75% of male main workers being engaged in non-agricultural pursuits, and a population density of at least 400 persons per square kilometre.

Inclusion of an area within a planning or master-plan boundary does not, by itself, convert a rural zone into an urban or statutory town area.

The Guidelines also authorised forfeiture of the security amount where the provisional selection was cancelled in accordance with their terms.

The Court distinguished between inclusion within the Namrup Master Plan and inclusion within the legally demarcated urban limits of the Namrup Town Committee.

The Master Plan covered Nagamati Kheremia Gaon for planning purposes but expressly placed it in the rural zone.

The contemporaneous reports of the Circle Officer and Namrup Town Committee confirmed that the offered land was not within the existing Town Committee demarcation as on 13 July 2018, thereby failing the statutory-town limb of the Census 2011 definition.

The petitioner also produced no material establishing that the village independently satisfied the alternative Census criteria.

In contrast, the population data showed that Nagamati Kheremia Gaon had a population of only 1,686, below the minimum threshold of 5,000, and there was no evidence satisfying the other two cumulative requirements.

Consequently, the offered land was not situated in an urban area and could not qualify for a Rurban distributorship.

IOCL therefore acted within the Guidelines in cancelling the provisional selection and forfeiting the security deposit.

IOCL’s rejection of the petitioner’s candidature and forfeiture of ₹50,000 were upheld.

The writ petition was dismissed, the impugned email dated 29 September 2018 was not interfered with, and the interim order was vacated.