Supreme CourtReligious and Personal LawCivil Procedure and Evidence

Sajjadanashin succession is governed by custom or nomination; power of attorney cannot confer spiritual office or authority.

Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadriv.Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri .

Sajjadanashin succession is governed by custom or nomination; power of attorney cannot confer spiritual office or authority.. Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha Khadri vs Syed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri .. Supreme Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeals under Section 100 of the CPC in light of concurrent findings of fact

The court held

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's judgment

It also directed

The Court held that Respondent No. 1 was validly nominated as the Jan-Nasheen by the original Sajjadanashin and is the lawful successor

It further held that since the findings were based on a thorough appreciation of evidence and involved no substantial question of law, the High Court correctly exercised its limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC

All interim orders were vacated

01Facts

The dispute involves succession to the office of Sajjadanashin (spiritual head) of the Hazarath Mardane-e-Gaib Dargah in Karnataka

p. 2 · ¶ 2

The original Sajjadanashin, Peer Pasha Khadri, nominated his grandson, Respondent No. 1, as his successor (Jan-Nasheen) via a Khilafatnama (Ex. P-72) dated 26.02.1981 following the death of his eldest son

p. 3 · ¶ 4

Upon Peer Pasha's death in 1988, Respondent No. 1 assumed office.

p. 3 · ¶ 5

The Appellant, the youngest son of Peer Pasha, challenged this, claiming the office based on a General Power of Attorney (Ex. D-1), a handwritten Khilafatnama (Ex. D-13), and an affidavit (Ex. D-23)

p. 3 · ¶ 5

Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court recorded concurrent findings in favor of Respondent No. 1, holding the office to be hereditary and the nomination valid

pp. 4-5 · ¶ 7-8

The High Court of Karnataka dismissed the Appellant’s second appeals, finding no substantial question of law

p. 6 · ¶ 11

02Issues

i.1. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the second appeals under Section 100 of the CPC in light of concurrent findings of fact

p. 15 · ¶ 30

ii.2. Whether the office of Sajjadanashin is hereditary in nature and governed by nomination by the incumbent

p. 16 · ¶ 32

iii.3. Whether the Khilafatnama (Ex. P-72) validly nominated Respondent No. 1 or was vitiated by interpolation

pp. 21-23 · ¶ 38-41

iv.4. Whether a General Power of Attorney or an affidavit can legally confer succession to a spiritual office

pp. 25-27 · ¶ 46-48

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 100 of the CPC, which restricts second appeals to "substantial questions of law" and prohibits interference with concurrent findings of fact unless perverse

p. 16 · ¶ 31

It relied on Mulla: Principles of Mahomedan Law to define the Sajjadanashin as a spiritual office distinct from the secular Mutawalli, where succession is regulated by custom or nomination by the incumbent

pp. 18-20 · ¶ 36-37

The Court followed Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (1976) regarding the spiritual character of the office

p. 18 · ¶ 36

The Court followed H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmaiamma (1959) regarding the burden of proof for alleged document interpolation

p. 24 · ¶ 42

It applied Suraj Lamp Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2012) to hold that a Power of Attorney creates only an agency and cannot transfer title or confer succession

p. 26 · ¶ 47

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100

04Reasoning

The Court observed that the Sajjadanashin is a spiritual preceptor whose succession, absent specific directions in a wakfnama, is governed by custom and nomination

p. 20 · ¶ 37

It found that Respondent No. 1's nomination via Ex. P-72 was supported by credible testimony from attesting witnesses and a formal religious ceremony

pp. 21-22 · ¶ 39-40

The Court rejected the Appellant's claim of interpolation (the word "Jannasheen") because the Appellant failed to produce expert evidence or prove forgery, noting that mere suspicion cannot displace a proved document

pp. 23-24 · ¶ 41-42

Regarding the Appellant's documents, the Court reasoned that Ex. D-1 (GPA) was merely an instrument of agency that terminated upon the principal’s death and could not confer spiritual succession

p. 26 · ¶ 46

Similarly, the affidavit (Ex. D-23) was deemed insufficient as it lacked the formality required for such a significant spiritual appointment

p. 27 · ¶ 48

The Court concluded that the Appellant's arguments regarding shared management did not affect the specific legal right to the office of Sajjadanashin

p. 28 · ¶ 51

05Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's judgment

p. 30 · ¶ 57

The Court held that Respondent No. 1 was validly nominated as the Jan-Nasheen by the original Sajjadanashin and is the lawful successor

p. 29 · ¶ 52

It further held that since the findings were based on a thorough appreciation of evidence and involved no substantial question of law, the High Court correctly exercised its limited jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC

p. 29 · ¶ 53-55

All interim orders were vacated

p. 30 · ¶ 58
Supreme Court

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Syed Mohammed Ghouse Pasha KhadrivsSyed Mohammed Adil Pasha Khadri .

Supreme Court · April 02, 2026

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