Sale deed executed beyond permission period under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of UPCH Act is not void.

Respondent No. 4 (Mathura Prasad Pandey), the recorded Bhumidhar, obtained permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation (SOC) on 30.06.1972 under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P.C.H. Act) to transfer the land to the petitioners.

The permission stipulated the transfer be completed by 29.07.1972; due to temporary legislative restrictions on land transfers, the parties executed a registered agreement to sell and transferred possession on 15.07.1972, with a formal sale deed finally executed on 16.02.1973 once restrictions were lifted.

Upon seeking mutation, Respondent No. 4 objected, arguing the sale deed was void as it was executed after the SOC’s deadline, leading the Consolidation Officer, Assistant SOC, and Deputy Director of Consolidation (DDC) to reject the mutation and declare the sale deed void.

1. Whether a sale deed executed after the expiry of the time limit prescribed in the permission granted under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P.C.H. Act is per se void or if the invalidity is curable.

2. Whether a transferor, having voluntarily executed a sale deed and received consideration, can legally object to mutation on the ground of technical non-compliance with the duration of the transfer permission.

Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P.C.H. Act (as it existed in 1972-73), which required written permission from the SOC for transfers in consolidation areas to prevent fragmentation of holdings.

The precedent in Lalta Prasad Srivastava v. IXth ADJ, Agra (1996) held that lack of prior permission does not render a transaction void per se and is a curable invalidity.

Smt. Sita Devi v. DDC, Jaunpur (1997) established that a sale deed executed beyond the period fixed in a permission order is not void if the delay was justified or not due to the vendee's laches.

Surya Narayan v. DDC (2018) clarified that permission is generally not required for transferring a whole holding, as it does not cause fragmentation.

The Court reasoned that the primary object of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) was to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural holdings during consolidation; since permission was initially granted, the intent of the authority was clear.

The Court found that the delay in executing the final sale deed (from July 1972 to February 1973) was sufficiently explained by the prevailing legislative ban on transfers at that time and such technical delays do not render the transaction "non-est" or void.

The Court observed that Respondent No. 4, having himself executed the registered sale deed after the ban was lifted, was estopped from challenging the mutation in an attempt to deprive the petitioners of the property.

The Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the orders of the Consolidation Officer, Assistant SOC, and DDC, and directed the Consolidation Officer to record the petitioners' names over Chak No. 70 within three months.