School register entries require foundational evidence to prove minority; voluntary consent by a major precludes rape conviction.

The Appellant was convicted by the 11th Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, on 31.03.2008 for offences under Sections 366 and 376 (two counts) of the IPC, receiving a maximum sentence of 10 years RI.

The prosecution alleged that on 08.07.2007, the Appellant, a mason, took the prosecutrix (allegedly 16 years old) from her home on the pretext of work.

She did not return and was later recovered from the Appellant’s maternal uncle's house.

The Appellant maintained his innocence, alleging false implication.

The Trial Court found the evidence reliable, leading to the conviction.

The Appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the grounds of the prosecutrix’s majority and her voluntary consent.

1. Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the incident?

2. Whether the ingredients of abduction and rape under Sections 366 and 376 of the IPC are satisfied given the conduct of the prosecutrix and the plea of consent?

The Court applied Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of school registers to prove age, noting that such documents lack evidentiary value without the underlying material used to record the age.

It relied on Alamelu v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385 and Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., which mandate that the same standard of proof for age must apply in criminal cases as in civil cases to protect the accused’s rights under Article 21.

Regarding the testimony of the prosecutrix and consent, the Court followed State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Keshav v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC OnLine SC 989, which hold that while a prosecutrix’s testimony can be a sole ground for conviction, it must inspire "sterling confidence" and be evaluated against the totality of circumstances.

The Court found the prosecution's evidence regarding the victim's age insufficient.

Although the school register (Ex. P/4) recorded her birth year as 1991, the witness (P.W.3) admitted he had no basis or certificate for that entry.

Furthermore, the testimonies of the parents (P.W.5 and P.W.6) regarding the ages and birth intervals of their five children created material contradictions, suggesting she might have been a major.

On the issue of consent, the Court noted the prosecutrix (P.W.4) voluntarily accompanied the Appellant to multiple villages, failed to raise an alarm during the journey, and admitted she would have stayed with the Appellant had the police not arrived.

The medical evidence (Ex. P/12) further weakened the case, as it showed no external or internal injuries and provided no definite opinion on recent sexual intercourse.

Consequently, the Court determined the prosecutrix was a consenting party.

The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the prosecutrix was a minor and that the evidence established she was a consenting party.

The Appellant was acquitted of all charges under Sections 366 and 376 IPC.

The Court directed the Appellant to furnish a personal bond under Section 437-A of the CrPC (Section 481 of the BNSS) to ensure appearance before the Supreme Court if necessary.