School Tribunal has jurisdiction over special education schools under Rule 20 of RTE Rules, 2011.

The Petitioner No. 1 is a Public Charitable Trust running a special school for deaf and dumb students (Petitioner No. 2), which receives grant-in-aid from the State

Respondent No. 1, a Special Teacher with 16 years of unblemished service, was terminated via a letter dated April 25, 2025, on the grounds that the school could not meet her demands/expectations and that her appointment was temporary/unapproved

Respondent No. 1 challenged this before the School Tribunal, Mumbai, which set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement with full back wages

The Petitioners moved the High Court, asserting the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the school is a "special school" governed by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the School Code, 1997, rather than the MEPS Act

1. Whether the School Tribunal has the jurisdictional competence to entertain an appeal from an employee of a "special school" governed by the Social Welfare Department

2. Whether the lack of approval from the Competent Authority (Social Welfare Department) serves as a valid legal ground for the termination of a teacher’s services

Rule 20 of the Maharashtra Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011, which expands the School Tribunal's jurisdiction to any school other than those run by the Government or Local Authority

Latika Rajaram Mane v. State of Maharashtra, which established that Rule 20 fundamentally altered the legal landscape by providing a judicial remedy to teachers of all primary schools to prevent exploitation

Secretary, A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More, holding that adjudicatory tribunals cannot be created by executive instructions (like the Code) but only by statute

The Full Bench ruling in St. Ulai High School v. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh, which dictates that "approval" is a matter of grant-in-aid between the management and the State and does not affect the validity of a teacher’s appointment

The Court rejected the Petitioners' jurisdictional challenge, noting that while the MEPS Act originally required "recognition" by specific Boards, the 2009 Right to Education Act and its 2011 Rules (specifically Rule 20) significantly broadened the Tribunal's scope to include any teacher or employee of a non-government school

The Court observed that Clause 86 of the School Code, 1997, which grants appellate power to a Social Welfare Officer, is a mere executive instruction and cannot override the statutory judicial forum provided by the MEPS Act/RTE Rules

On the merits, the Court found the termination order to be arbitrary and resembling a "personal contract of service" rather than a governed employment

Following established precedent, the Court reasoned that the management cannot use the "want of approval" as a tool for termination, especially for an employee with 16 years of service, as approval is not a statutory condition precedent for a valid appointment

The termination was illegal as the "want of approval" is not a valid ground for dismissal under the law

The Court dismissed the Writ Petition and upheld the School Tribunal’s order and refused to stay the order of reinstatement, citing the Respondent’s long tenure and the lack of reasoning in the termination notice