Scope of Section 36(2) enquiry is restricted to fraud; later disagreements on valuation cannot justify revocation.

Respondent No. 3 (Trust) executed a lease in 1917 and an assignment in 1932. Claiming the lease was terminated in 2016, the Trust obtained sanction from the Joint Charity Commissioner (JCC) under Section 36(1) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act on 24 May 2018 to grant a new lease to the Petitioner with an option to purchase reversionary rights.

Following the execution of the lease and a conveyance deed, Respondent No. 2 (heir of the former assignee) challenged the sanction under Section 36(2).

On 29 January 2020, the JCC revoked the sanction, citing non-disclosure of the 2016 termination notice, lack of transparency in advertisements regarding renewal rights, and inadequate valuation.

1. Whether the Joint Charity Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 36(2) by revoking a sanction after the execution of conveyance in the absence of established fraud.

2. Whether the non-disclosure of specific litigation documents or procedural irregularities in advertisements constitutes "fraud" or "concealment of material facts" sufficient to invalidate a completed transaction.

The court primarily applied Section 36 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Section 36(1) requires prior sanction for the alienation of trust property, emphasizing the "interest, benefit, or protection" of the trust.

Section 36(2) permits revocation only on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts.

Crucially, the Proviso to Section 36(2) mandates that once a conveyance is executed, a sanction can only be revoked on the ground that it was obtained by "fraud practiced upon the Charity Commissioner".

The Court reasoned that Section 36(2) does not grant appellate or merits-based review power; it is a narrow jurisdiction confined to establishing fraud.

Since the conveyance was already executed, the higher threshold of the Proviso applied.

The Court found that "fraud" requires strict proof and intentional deception, which was absent here.

The JCC was already aware of the property's encumbrances and disputes during the Section 36(1) stage, so the non-production of one specific notice did not constitute fraudulent concealment.

Furthermore, the JCC erred by using Section 36(2) to resolve tenancy and title disputes—issues that belong to civil courts—rather than focusing on whether the authority itself was defrauded.

Disagreements over valuation or the "prudence" of the transaction are matters for the sanction stage, not grounds for later revocation unless linked to fraud.

Retrospective directions to return the consideration and restore trust records were set aside.

The Court held that the JCC traveled beyond his statutory jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of the transaction rather than proving fraud. All independent claims regarding title, tenancy, and ownership rights were kept open for agitation before appropriate forums. Stay on the judgment was refused.