Second FIR over alleged 73-person fake FMGE certificate network can proceed, Rajasthan HC rules

The petitioner invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashing of FIR No. 08/2026 dated 04.02.2026, registered by the Special Police Station–SOG, Rajasthan, for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the IPC and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2008.

The petitioner contended that the FIR was a second FIR based on the same facts and evidence as FIR No. 34/2025, registered at the same police station concerning the alleged use of a forged FMGE certificate by Piyush Kumar Trivedi for applying for internship with the Rajasthan Medical Council.

During investigation of the first FIR, the police allegedly discovered that the forged certificate had been procured through the petitioner and that several other persons were involved; approximately 73 persons had allegedly applied for internship on the basis of forged FMGE certificates.

The petitioner was subsequently made an accused in both cases, and charge-sheets had been filed in both matters.

Whether FIR No. 08/2026 was impermissible as a second FIR concerning the same occurrence, transaction, facts and evidence already covered by FIR No. 34/2025?

Whether the subsequent discovery of a larger conspiracy or organised network involving multiple forged FMGE certificates constituted a distinct criminal design permitting registration of a separate FIR?

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the subsequent FIR after filing of charge-sheets in both cases?

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, which empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice, but is to be exercised sparingly.

Under the principles in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, ordinarily only the earliest information relating to the same cognizable offence or occurrence may be registered as an FIR; subsequent information concerning the same transaction must be addressed through further investigation and a further report under Section 173(8) CrPC.

Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI similarly holds that additional evidence, accused persons or particulars relating to the same occurrence do not ordinarily justify a fresh FIR.

However, Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., and Awadesh Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar recognise that a counter-version, distinct occurrence, separate transaction or larger conspiracy may sustain a subsequent FIR.

State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav establishes that similarity in the nature of offences is insufficient; the Court must examine whether the factual foundation and criminal acts are substantially identical.

The governing test is therefore whether the subsequent FIR concerns the same transaction and offence, or instead discloses a distinct offence, transaction or wider criminal design.

The Court distinguished the two FIRs by examining their genesis, factual foundation and scope rather than merely comparing the accused or penal provisions.

FIR No. 34/2025 arose from an individual complaint concerning Piyush Kumar Trivedi’s alleged use of one forged FMGE certificate for obtaining internship, in the backdrop of a matrimonial dispute; it did not initially allege a wider conspiracy or organised certificate-forgery network.

In contrast, investigation revealed that the petitioner allegedly supplied forged certificates and that approximately 73 persons had applied for internships using such certificates, indicating a broader and organised criminal activity involving preparation, procurement and distribution of forged certificates.

Consequently, the second FIR was not treated as a mere elaboration or continuation of the first occurrence, but as relating to a distinct and wider criminal conspiracy.

The existence of common accused, common offences and an investigative link between the cases did not, by itself, attract the prohibition against a second FIR.

Since charge-sheets had already been filed, the petitioner’s alleged involvement in the respective offences was held to be a matter for appreciation of evidence at trial, not for determination in the inherent-jurisdiction proceedings.

The first FIR concerned an individual instance of alleged use of a forged FMGE certificate, whereas the subsequent FIR disclosed a larger, organised network involving multiple persons and transactions; therefore, it had a distinct and wider factual foundation.

The petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 08/2026 was dismissed as devoid of merit.

The stay application and pending applications were also dismissed, with the Court clarifying that its observations would not prejudice the pending trials.