Section 106 Evidence Act cannot shift the burden absent foundational facts and exclusive accused knowledge.

Chandan, the deceased, was the eldest son of informant Lallu Verma (PW-1) and was married to Keskali, who was alleged to have developed an illicit relationship with the appellant, Chhotu Verma, the deceased’s younger brother.

The prosecution alleged that, following strained relations between Chandan and the appellant, the appellant murdered Chandan with an axe inside the family house at about 3:00 a.m. on 27 July 2016; Keskali was alleged to have participated in the conspiracy.

The FIR was allegedly lodged the same day at about 9:30 a.m.

The trial court framed charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and Keskali.

Although the three principal witnesses of fact—PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3—were declared hostile, the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, while acquitting Keskali.

The appellant challenged the conviction, contending that the FIR was not proved, the alleged axe recovery was inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Section 106 could not be invoked because other family members were present, and material circumstances had not been put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

1. Whether the FIR could be treated as substantive evidence of the prosecution case when its alleged maker did not support it and stated that his thumb impression had been obtained on blank paper?

2. Whether the alleged recovery of the axe was admissible against the appellant under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?

3. Whether the burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act could be invoked when other family members were also present in the house?

4. What was the effect of failure to put the material incriminating circumstances specifically and fairly to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C.?

5. Whether the prosecution established the motive and a complete chain of circumstances sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 IPC?

The Court applied Section 302 IPC, governing punishment for murder, and the settled rule that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires every circumstance to be firmly established and the circumstances collectively to form a complete chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.

Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, only that portion of information furnished by an accused in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible; the prosecution must prove the accused’s custody, the information furnished, its nexus with the discovery, and the resulting discovery.

Section 106 does not shift the prosecution’s primary burden or permit deficiencies in the prosecution case to be filled by an adverse inference; it applies only after foundational facts are established and the relevant fact is especially within the accused’s knowledge.

The Court relied on Sadasiv Dhodhi Ram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) INSC 93, for this principle.

Section 313 Cr.P.C. requires that each material incriminating circumstance be put specifically, distinctly and fairly to the accused, and a circumstance not so put ordinarily cannot be relied upon where the omission causes prejudice.

An FIR is not substantive evidence of the truth of its contents and may ordinarily be used only for corroborating or contradicting its maker.

The Court held that the FIR could not independently prove the appellant’s participation because PW-1 did not support its contents and stated that his thumb impression had been obtained on blank paper; the FIR therefore had diminished evidentiary value.

The alleged axe recovery did not satisfy Section 27 because the Investigating Officer did not establish that the appellant furnished any disclosure statement or that the axe was discovered in consequence of such information; the axe was instead produced by PW-3, Mithun.

Section 106 was also unavailable because the prosecution’s own material indicated that other family members were present in the house, so the circumstances could not be treated as exclusively within the appellant’s knowledge.

Section 106 could not be used to select the appellant from among several persons present or to compensate for the prosecution’s failure to establish foundational facts.

The Court further found that material circumstances, including the alleged motive, recovery and failure to explain the occurrence, had not been specifically put to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C.; consequently, no adverse inference could properly be drawn from his alleged failure to explain them.

Finally, the alleged illicit relationship and motive were unsupported by reliable substantive evidence, the material witnesses had turned hostile, the recovery was legally deficient, and the mere presence of the dead body inside the house did not establish the appellant’s guilt.

The circumstances therefore failed to form a complete and unbroken chain.

The FIR was not substantive evidence; the axe recovery was not admissible as a Section 27 discovery; Section 106 could not be invoked to shift the prosecution’s burden; and the unput circumstances could not be used against the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

Holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment dated 2 April 2019, and acquitted Chhotu Verma of the charge under Section 302 IPC.

His bail bonds and sureties were discharged, and, if not required in any other case, he was directed to be released forthwith subject to compliance with Section 437A Cr.P.C., corresponding to Section 481 of the BNSS.