Section 11 jurisdiction is limited to verifying arbitration agreement existence, leaving substantive disputes to the tribunal.

The Petitioner filed an application under Sections 11(5) and (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of an arbitrator based on three Inter-Corporate Deposit Agreements (ICDs) dated 25.10.2016, 22.02.2017, and 10.08.2017

Clause 7 of the ICDs provided for dispute resolution through arbitration in New Delhi

The Petitioner invoked arbitration via a legal notice on 04.04.2025

The Respondent opposed the petition on two primary grounds: first, that the disputes were fully settled (accord and satisfaction) following a payment of ₹6 lakhs pursuant to a court order dated 06.02.2025 in separate proceedings

second, that the claims were ex-facie barred by limitation, having been filed nearly six years after the cause of action arose

The Petitioner countered that the previous settlement only concerned cheque bounce cases, interest remained outstanding, and that the 2025 payment constituted an acknowledgment of liability, thereby renewing the limitation period under Section 19 of the Limitation Act

1. Whether the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act, can adjudicate upon issues of "accord and satisfaction" or "limitation."

2. Whether the scope of judicial scrutiny under Section 11 is limited to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement.

The court primarily applied Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which limits judicial intervention to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement

It relied heavily on the three-judge bench decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, which established that "accord and satisfaction," being a mixed question of law and fact, falls within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal

The court further noted the seven-judge bench ruling in In re, Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, which emphasized minimal judicial interference and the principle of arbitral autonomy

The Court observed that under the prevailing legal framework established in Krish Spinning, the Referral Court's role is strictly facilitative and procedural

The Court noted that determining whether the parties' disputes were finally resolved through previous litigation or whether the claim is barred by limitation would require a "laborious enquiry" into the factual matrix and a contested appreciation of evidence

The Court reasoned that such an inquiry is reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal under the principle of competence-competence

It explicitly rejected the application of tests like the "eye of the needle" or "ex-facie meritless" at the Section 11 stage, stating they are not in conformity with modern arbitration principles that prioritize arbitral autonomy over judicial interference

Since the existence of the arbitration clause in the ICDs was not in dispute, the Court held that all other contentions must be urged before the arbitrator

The Court held that the Referral Court must confine itself to a prima facie examination of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and nothing else

It directed that the arbitrator's fee be governed by the Fourth Schedule of the Act

clarified that all rights and contentions regarding the merits, including limitation and settlement, remain open for adjudication by the learned Arbitrator

The petition was disposed of accordingly