Section 11 scrutiny is limited to the prima facie existence of a written arbitration agreement.

The Petitioner, Kotak Mahindra Prime Ltd., filed a petition under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.

The dispute arose from two agreements: a Car Finance Agreement dated 24.01.2024 and a Personal Loan Agreement dated 30.01.2025, the latter being a "top-up" to the former.

Both agreements contained arbitration clauses (Clause 32 and Clause 27 respectively) providing for the nomination of an arbitrator by the lender.

The Petitioner contended that the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction based on the schedules attached to the agreements.

The Respondent expressed no objection to the referral.

1. Whether the Court should appoint a Sole Arbitrator to resolve disputes arising out of the Car Finance and Personal Loan agreements in a composite manner.

2. What is the permissible scope of judicial scrutiny by a Referral Court at the stage of a Section 11 application.

The Court applied Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically noting the effect of Section 11(6-A) which limits judicial intervention.

It relied heavily on the three-judge Bench decision in *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning* (2024), which incorporated the seven-judge Bench ruling in *Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re*.

The established principle is that the Referral Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a *prima facie* examination of the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, leaving issues of "validity," "accord and satisfaction," or "frivolity" to the Arbitral Tribunal under the principle of *competence-competence*.

The Court observed that the legal position regarding Section 11 is no longer *res integra*.

Citing *Krish Spinning*, the Court emphasized that its role is "facilitative and procedural," intended to give effect to the parties' intent to arbitrate without embarking on a "laborious enquiry."

Since the Petitioner demonstrated the existence of arbitration clauses in both agreements and the Respondent did not object to the referral, the Court found it appropriate to exercise its power to resolve the deadlock in the appointment process.

The Court noted the Petitioner's submission that the two agreements could be dealt with in a composite manner as the personal loan was a top-up to the car finance.

The Court held that all rights and contentions, including those regarding the merits of the claims, remain open for the Arbitrator to decide.

The Arbitrator was directed to provide disclosures under Section 12(2), and fees were set in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the Act.

The petition and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.