Section 113A presumption of abetment requires proof that the deceased was subjected to cruelty.

Jagrutiben, married to accused No. 1 about one and a half years before her death, died after consuming poison on 3 May 2012.

The Sessions Court acquitted the accused of offences under Sections 498A, 306 and 114 IPC. The State appealed under Section 378 CrPC. During the appeal, respondent No. 2 died, and the appeal against him abated.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents subjected Jagrutiben to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A IPC or abetted her suicide under Sections 306 and 107 IPC.

2. Whether the Sessions Court’s acquittal disclosed an error warranting appellate interference.

Sections 498A, 306 and 107 IPC require proof of the relevant cruelty and of abetment; the court held that the prosecution must establish a factual basis of cruelty before a presumption relating to abetment can arise.

Section 113A of the Evidence Act permits—but does not compel—a presumption of abetment where a married woman dies by suicide within seven years of marriage and is shown to have been subjected to cruelty; Section 113B concerns dowry death and requires proof of cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand soon before death.

The Court relied on Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, and Ram Pyare v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 6 SCC 820, among other decisions, on the requirements for abetment and statutory presumptions.

On an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may review the evidence, but must account for the reinforced presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, it should not displace the acquittal.

The Court found material contradictions in the accounts of prosecution witnesses PW-1 to PW-4. The father’s trial testimony added a dowry-cruelty allegation absent from the FIR, but no evidence established a dowry demand; the brother’s account was also exaggerated, and the evidence did not substantiate specific cruelty or harassment by the respondents.

The deceased and her husband lived separately from the other respondents, while the alleged complaints about cooking and household maintenance were not, on this record, supported by specific evidence of cruelty. The deceased had recently attended a family ceremony, and no harassment was reported or noticed then.

Because the evidentiary foundation for cruelty was lacking, the Court found no basis to invoke Section 113A; the dowry-related requirements of Section 113B were likewise unsupported. Applying the deferential standard for appeals against acquittal, the Court found no perversity or material error in the trial Court’s assessment.

The State’s appeal was dismissed, the acquittal confirmed, and the bail bonds cancelled.

The appeal against respondent No. 2 had already abated following his death.