Section 113B presumption cannot arise unless the prosecution proves the foundational ingredients of dowry death.

Karpuri Devi, the wife of appellant Madan Kamat, was reported missing approximately three years after her marriage.

Her relatives later located scattered skeletal remains near the Kamla River, which they identified as hers by reference to a key, taabeez and mala.

The prosecution alleged dowry-related cruelty and charged the appellants under Sections 304B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The trial court convicted them and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304B and two years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 201.

The appellants challenged the conviction in these appeals under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The High Court considered the evidence, including the medical evidence that the skeletal remains were female but that the cause of death could not be ascertained, and noted that the investigating officer was not examined.

1. Whether the prosecution proved that the skeletal remains were those of Karpuri Devi and that her death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances

2. Whether the prosecution proved that the death occurred within seven years of marriage

3. Whether the deceased was subjected, soon before her death, to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry, so as to sustain a conviction under Section 304B IPC and invoke the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act

4. Whether the convictions under Sections 304B and 201 IPC could be sustained in light of the evidentiary deficiencies and the non-examination of the investigating officer

Section 304B IPC requires proof that a woman’s death was caused by burns or bodily injury, or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; that it occurred within seven years of marriage; and that soon before her death she was subjected by her husband or a relative to cruelty or harassment in connection with a dowry demand.

Under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, the presumption of dowry death arises only once the prosecution establishes that foundational requirement of dowry-related cruelty or harassment soon before death.

The court relied on Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra for the principle that an omission to put a material circumstance to an accused under Section 313 CrPC does not automatically vitiate the trial, but prejudice must be considered.

It also relied on S. Kaleeswaran v. State of T.N. for the caution that identification of decomposed remains, including through forensic techniques, requires reliable supporting evidence and may be unsafe as a sole basis for conviction.

Munna Lal v. State of U.P. was cited for the proposition that non-examination of the investigating officer may create a material lacuna where the omission causes prejudice to the accused.

The prosecution’s identification of the remains rested principally on articles said to have been found with the scattered skeleton; the medical evidence established only that the remains were female and did not establish the cause of death.

The court found no reliable link between the deceased’s disappearance and the recovery, and noted inconsistencies about the recovery and police arrival, as well as the omission to put the identification circumstance to the appellants under Section 313 CrPC.

The court also found that the witnesses could not provide cogent evidence of the marriage date, and that the evidence of dowry demand and cruelty was vague, inconsistent as to the amount demanded, and insufficient to establish harassment “soon before” death.

Consequently, the statutory prerequisites for Section 304B and the Section 113B presumption were not established.

The investigating officer’s absence further prejudiced the defence on material questions about the recovery and investigation.

The trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence under Sections 304B and 201 IPC was set aside, both appeals were allowed, and the appellants—who were on bail—were discharged from their bail bonds.