Section 113B presumption cannot arise without proving dowry-related cruelty soon before death.

Pusha Kumari was married to respondent Sumit Kumar Pandit approximately two years before her death.

Her brother, Nitish Kumar, alleged that after the marriage, the respondents subjected her to cruelty and harassment for dowry, including demands for gold, a bed and ₹2 lakh.

On 12 June 2021, the informant was informed that Pusha had been killed at her matrimonial home.

The post-mortem indicated death by throttling.

An FIR was registered under Sections 304B/34 IPC, followed by charge-sheets against all four respondents; charges under Sections 304B and 498A read with Section 34 IPC were framed.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses, including family members of the deceased, the Investigating Officer, the doctor and an independent witness.

The defence examined two witnesses.

The Sessions Judge, Khagaria acquitted the respondents on 16 December 2024, finding inconsistencies in the alleged dowry demands, absence of proof of cruelty “soon before” the death, lack of specific attribution, and an incomplete chain of circumstantial evidence.

The State preferred the present appeal against acquittal under Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC/Section 419(1) and (3) BNSS.

Whether the prosecution established the foundational ingredients of dowry death under Section 304B IPC, particularly cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, a dowry demand “soon before” the deceased’s death, so as to invoke the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act?

Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal was perverse, manifestly erroneous or otherwise warranted interference in an appeal against acquittal?

Section 304B IPC requires proof that a woman died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage and was subjected, soon before her death, to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative for, or in connection with, a dowry demand.

Section 113B of the Evidence Act creates a mandatory presumption of dowry death only after these foundational facts, particularly dowry-related cruelty or harassment proximate to the death, are proved by the prosecution.

In Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157, the Supreme Court identified the essential ingredients of Section 304B and the prerequisites for invoking Section 113B.

Baijnath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 1 SCC 101, establishes that the presumption cannot cure the prosecution’s failure to prove the foundational facts.

Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1, explains that “soon before” requires a proximate and live link between dowry-related cruelty and death.

Under Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but must account for the strengthened presumption of innocence and should not interfere where the Trial Court’s view is reasonably possible.

The Court held that the unnatural death within approximately two and a half years of marriage satisfied only some preliminary circumstances and did not, by itself, establish dowry death.

Although PWs 1–4 alleged dowry demands, their accounts differed regarding the amount and nature of the demands—variously referring to cash, gold, a vehicle, a bed or a divan—and did not consistently identify which respondent made which demand.

There was no prior complaint, independent corroboration of the alleged panchayat, or specific evidence of cruelty closely preceding the death.

Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the required proximate and live link between dowry-related cruelty and the death, and the presumption under Section 113B could not be invoked.

The medical evidence established throttling but did not identify the assailant; the source of information and the alleged involvement of the respondents also varied.

Evidence suggesting that Sumit and Sudhir were in Ludhiana further weakened the circumstantial case, which did not form a complete chain pointing unerringly to guilt.

The Trial Court’s view was therefore reasonably possible and was not perverse or manifestly erroneous.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove the foundational ingredients of Section 304B IPC, particularly dowry-related cruelty or harassment soon before the death; therefore, the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act was unavailable.

The Trial Court’s acquittal was found to be a lawful and reasonably possible view, with no perversity or manifest illegality warranting appellate interference.

Accordingly, the government appeal was dismissed at the admission stage, and any pending applications were also disposed of.