Section 113B presumption requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of its foundational facts.

Rukmini married Krishan Kumar on 6 July 2008 and died by burns on 15 February 2010, within seven years of the marriage.

Her father first submitted a written report at the police station on the day of her death; the prosecution did not produce it. A second report, alleging dowry demands and cruelty, was submitted on 2 March 2010, and an FIR was registered that day.

The Sessions Court convicted Krishan Kumar, his father Shiv Lal, and his mother Chhediya under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, sentencing them to life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC.

Shiv Lal died during the appeal, and his appeal abated; the appeals were pressed for Krishan Kumar and Chhediya.

Whether the prosecution proved the foundational facts for dowry death under Section 304-B IPC and the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, including dowry-related cruelty or harassment “soon before” the death.

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR, suppression of the first report, and contradictions in the witnesses’ testimony undermined the prosecution case.

Whether the defective examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC caused prejudice warranting relief or a remand for fresh examination.

Section 304-B IPC applies where a woman dies from burns, bodily injury, or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or a relative in connection with a dowry demand; only after these foundational facts are proved beyond reasonable doubt does the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arise.

Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act permits an adverse inference where material evidence is withheld.

Section 313 CrPC requires the court to put each material incriminating circumstance to the accused; an omission does not automatically vitiate a trial, but prejudice must be assessed in the circumstances of the case (*Nar Singh v. State of Haryana*, (2015) 1 SCC 496; *Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam*, (2013) 12 SCC 406; *State of U.P. v. Mohd. Iqram*, (2011) 8 SCC 80).

The appeal also concerned convictions under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Court found that the first report, recorded on the day of the death, did not mention dowry demands, while the allegations appeared in the second report lodged fifteen days later. The prosecution’s failure to produce the first report, together with contradictions in the account of how the FIR came to be registered, supported an adverse inference and weakened the explanation for the delay.

The Court also found material inconsistencies between the father’s and mother’s accounts concerning the timing, purpose, and payment of alleged demands, and considered their allegations against the family members general and unreliable, particularly given evidence that the couple lived separately from other relatives.

The medical evidence recorded burn injuries but no other ante-mortem injuries, undermining the allegation that Rukmini had been assaulted and throttled before being burned.

As the prosecution had not credibly established dowry-related cruelty soon before the death, the foundational facts for Section 304-B and the Section 113-B presumption were not proved.

The Section 313 questions were also omnibus and did not put specific incriminating circumstances and roles to the accused; although the Court found the procedure mechanical, it declined to remand the case in light of the time elapsed, Krishan Kumar’s period in custody, and the other deficiencies in the prosecution case.

It set aside the convictions and acquitted Krishan Kumar and Chhediya; the appeals were allowed, with no remand for fresh Section 313 proceedings.

The judgment directed that Hindi translations be served on the appellants through the Secretary, District Legal Services Authority.