Section 14 exclusion requires continuous due diligence and good faith; unexplained delays defeat limitation protection.

The appellants were Pujaris/Archaks employed by the respondent Trust at Adya Katyayani Shakti Peeth Mandir, Chhatarpur.

Appellant No. 1 joined in 1990 and Appellant No. 2 in 1993.

They alleged that the Trust introduced a “Sevadar Form” containing altered service conditions, which they refused to accept, and that they were thereafter assaulted, threatened and forcibly removed from the temple premises.

Their services were allegedly discontinued on 4 July 1998, following a public notice prohibiting their entry into the temple.

The appellants had earlier instituted civil proceedings, pursued W.P.(C) No. 4390/1998, an appeal in LPA No. 586/2014, and SLP(C) No. 25053/2018.

The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on 7 May 2019 while granting liberty to pursue remedies available in law.

The appellants instituted the present suit on 24 February 2020 seeking reinstatement, arrears of salary from 4 July 1998, damages and litigation expenses, along with an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The District Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, holding the suit barred by limitation and finding that the appellants had not prosecuted the earlier proceedings with due diligence.

Whether the appellants were entitled to exclude, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period spent pursuing the earlier proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court.

Whether the suit seeking reinstatement, arrears of salary and damages was barred by limitation and could consequently be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits exclusion of the time spent prosecuting another civil proceeding, provided that the proceeding was pursued with due diligence and in good faith, concerned the same matter in issue, and was prosecuted before a court unable to entertain it because of defect of jurisdiction or a cause of a like nature; due diligence and good faith are cumulative requirements.

Mere institution of successive proceedings is insufficient; the remedy must have been pursued continuously, bona fide and with due care and attention.

Liberty granted by a superior court to pursue remedies “available in law” does not extend limitation or revive a remedy already barred by time.

Under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, a plaint may be rejected where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by law.

Relying on Narne Rama Murthy v. Ravula Somasundaram, (2005) 6 SCC 614, the Court held that limitation may be decided at the outset where the bar is apparent from the pleadings; an issue is necessary only where limitation is a mixed question of fact and law.

The cause of action for reinstatement and salary arrears arose when the appellants’ services were discontinued in 1998, whereas the suit was filed on 24 February 2020 and was therefore prima facie beyond limitation.

The appellants failed to explain the interval between the disposal of the writ petition on 21 July 2009 and the filing of the LPA in 2014.

Their lack of diligence was further demonstrated by the unexplained 949-day delay in filing the SLP, which the Supreme Court had specifically noticed while dismissing it.

The High Court also held that the earlier writ and appellate proceedings involved reliefs different from those claimed in the present suit, and their mere pendency could not justify exclusion of the entire intervening period under Section 14.

Since the appellants failed to establish continuous prosecution in good faith and with due diligence, Section 14 could not save the otherwise time-barred suit.

The bar of limitation was apparent from the appellants’ own pleadings, permitting rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

It held that they were not entitled to exclusion of the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and that their suit for reinstatement, salary arrears and damages was patently barred by limitation.

The appeal was dismissed, the District Judge’s order rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was upheld, and the pending application was disposed of.