Section 149 IPC imposes constructive liability without proof of each member’s specific overt act.

The appellants, Dilip Yadav and Nityanand Yadav, challenged their conviction by the Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Araria, in Sessions Trial No. 1376 of 2013 arising from Bhargama P.S. Case No. 65 of 2013.

They were convicted under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 324, 326 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced, inter alia, to imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC, with the sentences directed to run concurrently; they were acquitted of the charges under Sections 25(1-B)A, 26 and 35 of the Arms Act.

According to the prosecution, at approximately 3:00 a.m. on 7 July 2013, the appellants and four unidentified persons, armed with sharp weapons and a country-made pistol, entered the house of Manju Devi and assaulted her husband, also named Dilip Yadav.

The deceased suffered a fatal sharp-cut injury to his neck. When Manju Devi attempted to intervene, she was allegedly assaulted on her left wrist.

The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of Manju Devi (PW-6), who named the appellants in her fardbeyan recorded at about 5:00 a.m.

The post-mortem confirmed death from haemorrhage and shock caused by sharp-cut injuries, while medical examination confirmed an injury to PW-6.

Whether the testimony of PW-6 was reliable for identifying the appellants and proving their participation in the assault despite the night-time occurrence and the absence of light inside the room?

Whether the discrepancies regarding the precise place of the deceased’s fall and the weapon allegedly used materially undermined the prosecution case?

Whether the failure to attribute the fatal neck injury to a particular appellant precluded conviction under Sections 302 read with 149 IPC?

Whether the investigative lapses, including non-seizure of blood-stained articles, non-exhibition of the inquest report and non-production of the country-made pistol, created a reasonable doubt requiring acquittal?

Whether the defence version that unknown dacoits committed the murder was sufficient to displace the prosecution case?

The Court applied Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC concerning unlawful assembly, rioting and constructive liability, Section 302 IPC concerning murder, Sections 324 and 326 IPC concerning voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons, and Section 452 IPC concerning house-trespass after preparation for assault.

Under Section 149 IPC, once membership of an unlawful assembly and its common object are established, every member may be held constructively liable for an offence committed in prosecution of that object, and proof of a separate overt act or attribution of each injury to each accused is not indispensable; the Court relied on Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437.

The Court further applied the principle that relationship with the deceased does not, by itself, disqualify a witness, relying on Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364.

Minor discrepancies which do not affect the core prosecution case are not fatal, as recognised in Sardul Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 672.

Defective investigation is not by itself a ground for acquittal where the substantive evidence remains reliable, in accordance with C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567.

The Court also relied on Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327, for the principle that inmates of a dwelling house are natural witnesses to an occurrence therein.

The Court held that PW-6 was a natural witness because she was present in the house with the deceased and had herself sustained an injury during the occurrence.

Although the room lacked internal lighting, she stated that she recognised the appellants, whom she already knew, in the light of an electric bulb situated nearby.

The Court found that recognition of known persons was not rendered impossible merely because the entire room was not illuminated.

Her prompt naming of both appellants within approximately two hours, the medical corroboration of her injury, and the evidence of PW-1 and PW-5 placing the appellants at the scene immediately after the occurrence provided sufficient assurance to her testimony.

The discrepancies concerning whether the deceased fell inside the house, at the threshold, near the door or in the courtyard were treated as differences in description of adjoining areas rather than material contradictions.

Similarly, the inconsistency between the reference to a farsa and a dabiya did not undermine the central allegation of a sharp-weapon assault, particularly since the medical evidence established sharp-cut injuries.

Given the prosecution case of a concerted armed attack by six persons, the Court held that the absence of a precise attribution of the fatal injury to either appellant did not defeat liability under Section 149 IPC.

The investigative deficiencies deprived the prosecution of possible corroborative material but did not discredit the direct testimony, medical evidence or immediate-aftermath evidence.

The alternative dacoity theory was rejected because it did not explain the prompt identification of the appellants or the evidence that they were seen fleeing from the scene.

The testimony of PW-6 was accepted as reliable, the medical evidence was found broadly consistent with the prosecution case, and the investigative lapses and minor discrepancies were held insufficient to create reasonable doubt.

The convictions of Dilip Yadav and Nityanand Yadav under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 324, 326 and 452 IPC were affirmed.

Their sentences, including life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and the concurrent sentences imposed for the other offences, were also affirmed, with set-off for the period already undergone.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellants were directed to remain in custody and serve the remaining sentence in accordance with law.