Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act provides a wage-claim procedure, not an offence.

Sixty-eight contract labourers complained to labour authorities that they had been refused further employment and had not received their alleged outstanding wages and other dues.

After correspondence with the principal employer, the Assistant Labour Officer filed an application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, seeking recovery of Rs. 1,55,820.

The SDJM registered it as a criminal complaint case and, by order dated 19 September 2019, took cognizance against the petitioner and the contractor.

The petitioner challenged that order under Section 482 CrPC, arguing that Section 15(2) provides a claims procedure, not an offence

1. Whether an application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act could be registered as a criminal complaint and result in cognizance of an offence under that provision

2. Whether the cognizance order should be set aside despite the State’s submission that the petitioner should first raise his objections before the trial court

Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act provides a mechanism for applying to the appointed authority for relief concerning unlawful wage deductions or delayed payment; it does not itself create an offence.

Under Sections 15 and 18, the authority adjudicates such claims and exercises specified civil-court powers.

Rules 3, 4, 8 and 11 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937 prescribe the application, authority, notice and procedural framework for those proceedings, which are quasi-judicial and substantially civil in character.

The High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to set aside an order that improperly treats such a claim as a criminal prosecution

The Court found that the application sought adjudication and recovery of alleged wage claims under Section 15(2), a provision that prescribes a claims process rather than an offence.

Read with Section 18 and the applicable Rules, the statutory scheme required the claim to proceed before the designated authority through the prescribed quasi-civil procedure.

The Magistrate therefore erred in registering the application as a criminal complaint and taking cognizance under Section 15(2).

The State’s objection that the petitioner should raise the matter before the trial court did not cure that legal defect

It left the opposite parties at liberty to initiate the appropriate proceedings under law, without expressing any view on the merits of the workers’ claims or the parties’ substantive contentions